Echoes and Aftermath

of the German Victory

 

All Rome was terrified by the news of Varus’ defeat. The capitol of the empire that ruled the world succumbed to hysteria. Fear of the wild peoples of the North was as great as the fear that had overtaken it 114 years before, during the invasion of the Cimberi and the Teutones. On top of this came the report that the ruinously expensive Pannonic War had finally come to an inconclusive end, which made Rome’s despair all the greater.

 

Most devastating of all was the fact that Arminius’ success utterly destroyed the Romans’ hybrid conviction of superiority and validation as rulers of the world.

 

Survivors of the battle who escaped to the Rhine as well as those whom the Germans had released to be messengers of the Roman defeat gave graphic reports of the catastrophe. The Roman courier express needed exactly five days to bring news of the calamity to the capital and into the hands of the emperor.

 

The news of the complete annihilation of three elite combat-ready legions with accompanying cavalry detachments, six cohorts of auxiliaries and huge beggage train caught the 71 year-old-emperor completely off guard, like a sudden cudgel blow to the head. If the message was correct, it meant that half the Army of the Rhine was lost. Almost all the officers must have been killed. For the Empire, this meant a loss of 12% of the total of 28 legions. It meant that Rome now had only 25 legions at its disposal.

This represented much more than just a lost battle. It meant everything left (west) as well as right (east) of the Rhine was endangered, since the entire Rhine border was significantly weakened. In some places it was entirely bereft of troops. Augustus had to send troops to the Rhine immediately from far distant garrisons in order to fill the gaps as well as possible.

 

Every base, fortification, depot and outpost east of the Rhine had to be considered lost, along with all its personnel. In addition, Augustus had to expect that the Cheruskans and their confederates would demand a high ransom for their prominent captives.

 

The greatest loss of all, however, was that of the three legions’ eagles. These field insignia, universally acknowledged symbols of Rome’s power and glory, were sacred to all Rome, not just the army. They had fallen into the hands of perfidious and underhanded barbarians who were now gloating in triumph.

 

This was experienced as deeply humiliating and degrading, as scandalous dishonor and ignominy that cried out for revenge. Rome was deeply shocked. The omnipotent Empire had been struck in its very heart.

 

Augustus himself had organized the three legions. At the beginning of the German wars, he had transferred them from Aquitane (in southwestern France) to the Rhine. He had sent the XVII (17th) Legion to Ara (Cologne) or Novaesium (Neuß) and he had sent the 18th and 19th to Vetera (Xanten.)

 

Footnote: Velleius Paterculus called the 17th Legion “The bravest (most gallant) of all legions, always in first place within the Roman armed forces...”

 

Augustus was strongly affected by the death of Varus, whom he considered one of the most capable of all Romans and to whom he was related. It is said that he repeatedly called out to the dead commander in deepest despair: “Varus! Varus! Give me back my legions!”

 

One of his first reactions was to immediately dismiss his Germanic bodyguards from Batavia in the Netherlands. No doubt this was done on the spur of the moment, since there was never a generalized Germanic solidarity movement.

 

He also commanded that the three annihilated legions should never be reconstituted. They were dropped forever from the official rolls of the 28 original imperial legions and garrisons without replacements. Even their numbers were dropped and never again assigned.

 

Superstition might have played a role here, as well as the instinctive suppression of an overwhelming national trauma, of which he could not and must not be reminded. Something quite similar happened in modern warfare following the American catastrophe in Vietnam.

 

All Romans, especially the wealthy, were terrified by the prospect of the rebels’ occupying all of Gaul beyond the Rhine, possibly even Italy. Obviously they believed Arminius and his hordes capable of such a feat. His name was on every tongue.

 

The possibility was not out of the question. In the eyes of the Romans, such an undertaking did not seem unrealistic. They were expecting a large-scale invasion throughout the following year. This never developed, however. It appeared that the Germans were unable to exploit their big chance. However, Arminius was being very realistic about his possibilities, and he understood the mentality of his fellow countrymen perfectly. The Germanic tribesmen were quite satisfied with what they had achieved with their restored and guaranteed freedoms.

 

Without the active collaboration of Marbod, there was no possibility of a general Germanic assault on the world of Mediterranean culture, as the Romans feared. Such an assault was out of the question because of the divisions between the tribes; above all, it would have required the active support and participation of Marbod. The Cheruskan chieftainsnever have even considered such an overextended utopian goal.

 

It is praiseworthy that Arminius wisely captured only the lightly manned camps on the right of the Rhine, since the vast majority of Roman forces were engaged on distant fronts. He appraised the situation very soberly, in keeping with his policy of political moderation.

 

Instead of planning a major offensive with uncertain outcome, he realized that he now had to begin making defensive preparations. Sooner or later, Rome would unleash a vengeful response -- that was deadly certain.

 

Fear of the Germans was so deeply embedded in the marrow of Roman bones that exaggerated speculations arose in response to these anxieties. As part of this speculation, certain groups with interests in increasing their profitable armaments dealings deliberately fanned the flames of the deeply rooted fear of barbarians.

 

After his resounding victory, Arminius allowed his people very little time to recuperate. In the following days and weeks, the Germans destroyed all the military bases, fortified road camps, post stations, and supply depots between the Rhine and Weser and along the Lippe. The small crews were thrown to the wolves. In situations like this, when the captors were flushed with victory, they would hardly have taken prisoners without great risk.

 

The only fortress that put up a determined resistance was the fortress Aliso* (Elsen), under the deputy commander Lucius Caeditius. This is probably the fort that Varus was trying to contact. Disorganized remnants of the Varus legions had made their way there, according to Velleius Paterculus (II/117). The Germans’ efforts to storm the fort bogged down, since they had no expertise in siege techniques. They resolved to starve out the defenders.

 

Footnote: * The fortress Aliso was located somewhere in the Lippe area.

It was apparently the easternmost Roman fortification.

 

Caeditius hoped for relief from Rome, but none came. He was able to fend off their furious but ineffectual attacks with his archers and catapults, inflicting considerable losses on his besiegers.

 

Arminius had not reckoned on such an effective defense. First he attempted to storm the fort with a ladder assault on the palisades, after filling the moat with tree trunks and bundled branches. The assault failed, as does an attempted Roman style “turtle shell” assault.

 

Footnote: This was an attack under a giant shield formed like a turtle’s shell.

 

The Germanic guerilla fighters were not adept at maintaining long drawn out sieges of well defended fortifications. The defenders were superior technically, and they could not be engaged anywhere. The siege continued.

 

Caeditius decided to try a ruse. He ordered that a group of captured Germans be shown storerooms filled with grain, then he ordered their hands chopped off, then he ordered their release.

 

Caedetius reckoned that the mutilated witnesses would relate what they had seen and the enemy would then lose enthusiasm for a siege lasting several more months, and he would be able to escape. He had to win time.

 

Arminius did not alter his decision, however. The Germans could wait, and sooner or later the Romans would have to capitulate.

 

Caedetius did not give in. He could hold out for a whole year if necessary. When his food did begin to run out, he used the opportunity of a stormy winter night to make his move, when the German guards were less attentive. His gallant crew attacked very suddenly and were able to fight their way through to the Rhine in a brilliant military breakthrough. Only then could Fort Aliso be destroyed. Unfortunately the Germanic victors did such a thorough job that the exact location, which would be very important to historians and archeologists, has still not been found. If the exact location were known, we could determine the location of the Varus battlefield much more closely.

 

During this period, the quarrel between Arminius and Segestes erupted stronger than ever. This vain admirer of Rome could not tolerate the fact that his unwanted son-in-law Arminius was celebrated as the great hero and liberator, attracting most of his own liegemen (including his son Segimund.) It annoyed him that he had been drawn into Arminius’ war as well through the overwhelming enthusiasm of his people.

 

There were apparently bitter confrontations between the “victor” and “vanquished” in those days. Segestes continued to be Arminius’ main political opponent. He was apparently denounced in the Gauthing (tribal council) and quarantined in his castle. It is also reported that Segestes was held captive for a time, and that he in turn had his hated son-in-law thrown in chains until he was freed by his people. Was Thusnelda perhaps involved in this “family feud?”

 

Arminius knew that Rome would not allow the Varus defeat to go unrevenged, and expected a prompt response.

 

He understood the Roman mentality and he knew what was in the mind of every Roman officer: “Revenge Varus!” He was also familiar with Tiberius, who at that time was still backing the policy of eastward expansion. There is no doubt that Arminius was constantly occupied with the question of when the Roman invasion would likely begin. However, Rome was not prepared to attack immediately. Her military installations were undermanned and she was in the process of organizing new military units. She had not yet replaced the losses caused by Armin’s offensive and the four-year Pannonian War. The greater part of the Roman army was scattered across the vast fronts of the Empire. But they would come, that was certain – and this time they would come in such numbers that they would outnumber the Germans four or five to one.

 

The seriousness of the new situation was certainly very clear to him. He knew he would not be able to resist unless he had strong and reliable allies at his side. Since he was familiar with Roman tactics, he assumed that they would begin by neutralizing first his nearest neighbors, so that they could more easily deal with him. What should he do when this situation actually developed and his confederates were defeated one by one?

 

Based on his experiences as a Roman officer, he could anticipate the operational plan of the major Roman counterblow. He had learned Roman strategy and tactics from the Romans themseves and so was familiar with their time-tested strategy of “march separately but attack together.” He had studied their favorite maneuver of the encircling pincers under Tiberius himself. Castra Vetera (Xanten), Ara (Köln), Mogontiacum (Mainz) or Novaesium (Neuß) had nearly always been the bases from which they launched their attacks, and he could well imagine the huge forces that were being gathered there. It was clear that a very costly war of revenge was going to be unleashed on the Cheruskans and their confederates by vastly superior forces. In order to meet this assault with the combined resistance of as many tribes as possible, he desperately needed the help of Marbod, who at that time was the leading military power in Germany.

 

For this reason he resumed negotiations with King Marbod through secret agents, strongly requesting that he not rule out an active supporting role this time. He emphatically pointed out that if he, Arminius, were defeated, then sooner or later, Marbod too would certainly be crushed in a follow-up attack.

 

His plan was that, in the event of a Roman invasion from the west, Marbod would invade the Danubian regions and tie down the Romans in the east, while he himself would surround them from the northwest and grind them down with tried-and-true guerrilla tactics. He saw a glaring weakness of the enemy in its overextended supply lines, which offered opportunity to cut off the combat troops from their supply bases. This was a bold plan that reflected Arminius’ strategic genius, envisioning an offensive war on two fronts that promised to banish the Roman threat for all time.

 

Alas, such a comprehensive plan (too comprehensive for Marbod!) failed because of his profound passivity.

 

Arminius’ victory over Varus had been a godsend for Marbod since it saved him from an imminent Roman invasion from the west. However he again proves impotent and fails to act, just as before the Varus battle.

 

We do not know the reason why he failed to take action this time; we can only speculate. Perhaps it was an unwillingness to take risk; perhaps a lack of capacity for political planning; perhaps the lack of solidarity with the other Germanic tribes. For Marbod, maintaining the status quo was the most important thing of all.

 

Thus Arminius remained isolated throughout Germanicus’ murderous campaigns of vengeance and conquest of the years 14, 15 and 16 AD. He was still supported by his steadfast confederates of the Varus batte, however. These campaigns were fought by the same parties that fought in Year 9, except that this time the Germans were facing massive superiority in a much more threatening and well-nigh hopeless prospect.

 

Had it occurred to Arminius that his victory over Varus was only a prelude to a subsequent three-year war that would be incredibly difficult and bloody? Did he realize that the struggle for freedom was beginning all over again, under conditions that were a great deal worse? He was not allowed much time before the counter-blow fell.

 

He had to make as good use of his time and his modest powers as was possible. He was compelled to travel all over the land, calling on his followers to increase their armaments and war preparations. The village smiths had their hands full producing lance points, swords, battleaxes and shield buckles, as well as converting peacetime agricultural implements to makeshift weapons.