MARBOD

 

Arminius and Marbod

Germanicus

Germanicus’ Leading Officers Whose Names Have Been Passed Down to Us

 

Marbod came from a respected branch of the Markomanni,* a Germanic tribe that initially settled in the Main region.

 

Footnote*: Literally, Markomanni meant “Men of the Border”

 

He was born in the year 24 BC, eight years before Arminius. Like many children of the Germanic nobility, he was kept hostage and received a Roman education, which strongly influenced the subsequent course of his life. Velleius Paterculus describes him on page 108 of his history as particularly well favored, tall and strong of body, with an excitable temperament.** From the Roman point of view he was “a barbarian only through national affiliation ... very clever; in fact too clever.” Thus he naturally possessed all those intellectual and physical attributes that the Germans expected in a tribal leader -- attributes the gods granted only to the most worthy.

 

Footnote: ** Valleius Paterculus, H.R. 108

 

After returning to his homeland at about age 16 he quickly took over leadership of the Markomanni, as was his birthright. Amazingly, this young ruler succeeded in persuading his people to abandon their permanent place of residence and migrate to the Celtic Bojem area between Erzgebirge, Riesengebirge and the Bavarian Forest within the natural “mountain fortress” that extended to the Danube. Velleius Paterculus called this country “Bojohemum,” which in Celtish meant “Home of the Bojer,” hence Bohemia.

 

Although he had never been a Gaugraf, or district ruler, Marbod must have soon been elected as duke, a position that normally lasted only for the duration of a military campaign. After this, he directed his attentions to establishing a Marcomanni kingdom. Only those who had been elected by a constituent assembly of nobility and freedmen could hope to attain the kingship, given the widespread Germanic aversion to rule by an individual. Somehow Marbod managed to become the first Germanic duke who gained the title and dignity of “King.” More than anything else his great charisma made this possible, since to the Germans’ irrepressible sense of freedom, “Kingdom” implied subjugation, dependence and obedience. If they subodinated themselves to an individual, it had to be of their own free will.

 

From the very beginning, Marbod strove for a powerful Germanic empire, a confederation of tribes under his sole and exclusive rule. This indicates powerful egotism and inclination to autocratic rule. He quickly brought his neighboring tribes, the East Germanic tribes, tribes along the Elbe, and the Swabians, Semnons, Langobards, and Lugians under his rule. He did this partly through treaties and partly by means that were less than fair.

 

When he had enough subjects, he based his royal rule on a standing army, in Roman fashion. It was a great novelty for the Germans. The size of his army (no fewer than 70,000 foot and 4,000 mounted troops) amazed his contemporaries. It was an alarmingly large army, especially for the Romans. Tacitus reports: “Through constant training, he formed the masses of those who protected his empire into an organization with near-Roman discipline. In a short time he increased his army to an alarming size.”

 

If we consider the area of the Markomann empire, which included at least today’s Czech Republic, Sudetenland and northern Austria, then military organization of this magnitude leads us to conclude that Marbod had an impressive organizational talent. Just quartering and feeding such huge numbers of men and animals, in addition to the requisite “armaments industry,” troop training and coordination of infantry and cavalry were truly amazing accomplishments. Nothing of the sort could be found anywhere else in Germania. If we further consider that his warriors consisted of forest-dwelling peasants and mountain folk plus occasional fractious nobility, his accomplishment and leaderhip qualities must be esteemed all the more highly.

 

And there was something else that was new and unique about this Germanic prince: He built himself a fortified stone castle in the Roman style, which was also highly unusual. In those days, tribal leaders lived on farmsteads that were not particularly well fortified. Usually they were protected primarily by sheltering natural terrain.

 

And there was still another novelty: Marbod possessed a modern state treasury and war chest that was many centuries ahead of its time. With so many soldiers, it cost a great deal to keep everyone happy, in addition to the expenses of bribes and spies. In addition, his royal bodyguard of outstanding warriors, with which he surrounded himself at all times, had to be paid very well.

 

A powerful cultural and political force emanated from this first “genuine” Germanic castle, situated high above a major settement (probably Budweis in Bohemia). Factories, workshops and merchants had become situated within its protective walls, presumably the nucleus of an early royal residence. At that time, Marbod was the definitive Germanic duke, without doubt the idol of countless young Germanic warriors. Martial fame and power, personal dignity, and divine regal bearing greatly impressed the Germanic soul.

 

Without doubt Arminius, who was around 20 at that time, had heard a great deal about mighty Marbod. He must have been highly enthused as he listened to the spirited discussions of the Roman officers, who were deeply impressed by his famous countryman.

 

Needless to say, Marbod’s comet-like career was closely monitored by the Romans.

 

Mighty Rome, maintaining spies and observers all over the world -- itinerant traders, emissaries, merchants and venal indigenous middlemen -- was actually afraid of Marbod!

 

Such a huge and unpredictable barbarian empire that possessed such a powerful army was a constant source of threats and danger, especially in a region where there were still gaps in the border defenses. It had to be neutralized, if they did not want to risk losing their recently won territories. Rome took the “barbarian king” very seriously indeed.

 

On one hand Marbod seemed to be striving for good diplomatic relations, but on the other hand he did not hide his hostility to Rome. His characteristic haughtiness and over-confidence showed no fear or inhibition; on the contrary, he considered himself on a military and political par with the Romans. As far as pride and self-confidence were concerned, he was on a level with an Ariovist or Vercingetorix.

 

In Year 5 the Danube region had not yet been completely secured by Rome. It is true that three legions were stationed in Pannonia (Hungary), but these were primarily auxiliary units. In the fortresses of Aquincum (Budapest), Arrabona on the Danube, Carnuntum near the Vindebona (Vienna) and Singidonum (Belgrade) a total of 18,000 soldiers were stationed – about a quarter of the Marcomann forces. Thus the Romans were greatly outnumbered.

In Year 5, Tiberius had subdued the North Germanic Chauci in East Friesland and had reached the Elbe. This was the long-established strategic goal for conquest. Drusus had reached it fourteen years earlier, but had been unable to extend it to Rome’s eastern border in Germania.

 

Now, in the year 6, Tiberius thought the time had come to eradicate the Marcomanni in a two front war, by means of a wide pincers movement from the Rhine and Danube.

 

The number of troops allocated for this grand offensive clearly showed what significance Rome placed on this King Marbod and his empire. Two full-strength armies of around 150,000 men (15 legions plus 7 auxiliary units) were marching on separate paths from West and South in order to catch Marbod in the pincers movement.

 

Only 5 more day marches separated the Romans from their goal, when a huge insurrection broke out behind the Danubian army in Pannonia and Illyria (today’s Austria, Western Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia and Damatia). Rome had never experienced such an insurrection. The reason for the uprising is easy to determine: the ruthless policy of exploitation, which Rome imposed on all its annexed peoples.

 

Several groups of peoples in the region, several hundred thousand strong, had risen in revolt, along with the auxiliary troops stationed there. They were now invading Italia, which was a potential calamity for Rome.

 

When that occurred, the entire campaign against Marbod that had been so painstakingly planned by the Roman general staff, was instantly abandoned. Two massive armies that were already marching into Bohemia had to be recalled and turned about on the spot -- one of the most difficult maneuvers for a field commander.

 

If at this highly critical moment, Marbod had attacked in his turn, the Roman invading forces would have been surprised in the process of regrouping and would themselves have been caught in a pincers operation! Marbod was in fact holding the key in his hand. No one could have stopped him from joining the rebellion or enlarging his kingdom.

Tiberius, the experienced old strategist, immediately recognized the danger. He immediately abandoned “Operation Marbod” and marched back across the Danube over the pontoon bridge (a masterpiece constructed by his pioneers) that he had crossed just a few days earlier. Then he set about suppressing the rebellion.

 

This completely unexpected about-face must have seemed like a miracle to Marbod -- like a gift from the gods. He was spared a deadly two-front war and retained his powerful position without a fight! The creative Roman diplomats, who were familiar with his mentality, quickly concluded a “favorable peace treaty” that obligated him to neutrality, thus protecting Tiberius’ rear. The Marcomann king was all too happy to agree: he could not have hoped for anything better.

 

The Pannonian-Illyrian Revolt, which soon became a particularly vicious and brutal war, would tie down Tiberius’ legions for another four years, during which Marbod was not threatened.

 

What motivated him to refuse to assist the Cherusker in putting an end to the threat of Roman conquest, once and for all, in the year 7 or 8? There is no doubt whatsoever that Arminius strongly urged him to take action at this uniquely opportune moment. Most probably he feared the subsequent wrath of the Romans if he should bind himself to an uncertain adventure. He was simply unwilling to put his army and his entire political position at risk.

 

It was certain that sooner or later Tiberius would return to his old plan. Was he not aiding Arminius indirectly with his mere presence, by threatening the Roman rear? He might have given Arminius these or similarly evasive reasons. They would have been thoroughly plausible, at least from his own point of view. Even when the victorious Cheruskan sent him Varus’ head, along with another urgent request to finally support the effort to drive the plundering aggressors from Germania, he still refused.

 

He sent the grisly trophy on to Augustus in a clear demonstration that he had nothing to do with Arminius and his policy of resistance. This was typical of his egocentric nature. He felt compelled to demonstrate to Arminius, who was eight years his junior, that he was not inclined to make common cause with a young rabble-rouser. He had to demonstrate to the Cheruskan upstart how partners of equal rank (the great king Marbod and Rome) dealt with one another. He did not want to appear a barbarian in Roman eyes; instead, he wanted to act exactly as a Roman would, from the same position of complete power and equal rank!

 

Was he actually trying to endear himself to the Romans? Did he really have greater contempt for Arminius than for those who, a short time ago, wanted to annihilate him, and whose favor he was now courting?

 

Unfortunately we do not know the contents of the accompanying message that he sent along with Varus’ head. It can only have been an attempt to ingratiate himself, providing further proof of Germanic ambiguity.

 

Marbod would bitterly regret his mistake: Rome continued to treat him as a barbarian who greatly overestimated his significance. Rome could never treat the rulers of other countries as its equals! It honored him and his well-intended gesture as little as it acknowledged his neutrality during the uprising in Pannonia and as little as it honored him when he was in distress.

 

Apparently he envied and distrusted young Arminius on account of his amazing success. The fact remained that Arminius, with a few groups of loosely organized peasant fighters, had vanquished the highly trained and well equipped army of a world empire! A great military leader like Marbod, who could appreciate such an accomplishment like no one else, should have been able to acknowledge it without envy.

 

Instead of now supporting the Cheruskan, whose victory, combined with the Pannonian War, had recued him from mortal danger, Marbod relapsed into his old character weaknesses.

 

Why should such a great king as he, with whom even Rome dealt on an equal basis, deal with this Cheruskan upstart?

 

The only thing of which Marbod was capable was holding onto his own power and increasing it, if possible. He saw only a competitor in Arminius, instead of a fellow combatant in a noble cause. Was he already afraid of rivalries in his own camp? Was he aware of changing attitudes and allegiances among his vassal tribes, regarding the heroic young liberator whose name was on everyone’s tongue? He apparently worried about Arminius more than he feared the Romans.

 

Even five years later, when Arminius and his weak confederation were fighting Germanicus in a desperate and lonely struggle that lasted three years, he still saw no reason to lend any assistance, take any risk, or make any sacrifice.

 

If he had stood by Arminius during this time, he too would reflect some of history’s glory; but there was no compromise for this power-hungry man. Having no concept of Germanic solidarity, Marbod was aware of no alternative to “Arminius or me!” He could not recognize and dared not seize the great opportunity for cooperation between the two most powerful tribes in northern and southern Germania. Marbod simply lacked Arminius’ courage and vision. He did not realize that another failure to act would result in his own collapse and ruin.

In Marbod’s regal perceptions, allies would of necesssity have to completely subordinate themselves -- a confederation of equals was out of the question. We do not know whether he demanded such complete and subordination on Arminius’ part. Nor do we know whether or for how long the Cheruskan, who was at the height of his fame, considered giving in to Marbod’s demands. If he were not entirely disgraced, Marbod would certainly have lost face among his followers if he had given up his leadership role. This was not the proper solution for the real victor, who by rights should be at the head of a kingdom. Furthermore, it was questionable whether shared leadership would even be possible. Conflicts would have been inevitable between two such strong personalities with such different characters, and these did in fact begin occurring shortly afterwards.

 

The conflicts promptly divided the Germans into two camps, just when it could have united into a single large powerful unity consisting of a northwestern and a southeastern portion. They believed their independence was more secure under Arminius, who championed Germanic independence, than under the egotistical Markomann king to whom they had to kowtow on accouint of his crown. This defection meant a great loss of military power, which of course bothered Marbod a great deal. His envy of Arminius turned to hate.

 

[There seems to be a sentence missing here]*

 

Footnote: *The Langobards lived between the lower Weser and Elbe (Lüneburger Heath – Altmark), the Semnonen between the Elbe and Spree (Mark Brandenburg), and the Sueben along the middle Elbe (Today’s Sachsen-Anhalt.)

 

The split caused problems for Arminius’ as well, as old malcontents in his own ranks began causing ever greater difficulties for him. Some of them, faithless and envious slaves to ambition, begrudged him his triumph and fame. Others, agents and supporters of Rome among the nobility, who were fearful of literally losing their heads, began agitating against him within the populace. Even family groups were torn apart by the rivalry between Arminius and Marbod.

 

The extent of the deep and unbridgeable chasm running through the Cheruskan elite is illustrated by the fact that Arminius’ uncle Ingomer, his companion in arms during the critical time of the Varus battle, abandoned him. He went over to the side of Marbod, becoming a renegade and traitor. The old warrior was fed up with always playing second fiddle; as the older man, he could no longer endure being subordinated to his young nephew. Wounded pride turned into irreconcilable animosity. In addition, Ingomer probably hoped that King Marbod would help him attain the long-coveted title of Herzog (duke) if only Arminius were not in the picture.

 

We can assume that secret threads also connected Marbod’s and Arminius’s adversaries. It could well be that Rome was again scheming and playing its favorite game of “Divide and Conquer.” There was nothing Rome would have liked better than for its opponents to weaken each other without its having to swing a sword. For them it was like sitting in the Coloseum, where they could rub their hands together and make bets while watching the blonde barbarians butcher one another.

 

Marbod was determined to eliminate Arminius as a competitor, and he was not ashamed to side with the Romans in a coalition against Arminius. Tiberius was dismissive, however. He asked where Marbod had been in Year 9, when Rome was threatened with invasion from this same enemy.

 

The struggle for supremacy between the two main Germanic leaders was unavoidable, and civil war broke out in Germania. In the year 17, two mighty German armies were confronting each other in Roman battle formations somewhere between the Elbe and the Hartz Mountains. Both commanders were Roman-educated, both armies trained in Roman tactics -- such tragic nonsense! The opposing countrymen were fighting as they had been trained to do by their enemy – but they were not fighting their common enemy, they were fighting each other!

 

Arminius, “uplifted by the love of his people” was inspired by the knowledge of his accomplishments in achieving freedom for his people, whereas Marbod was driven by greed for power and unadulterated hate.

 

Tiberius could celebrate a double triumph: He could observe with profound satisfaction as the barbarians abandoned themselves to domestic power struggles. King Marbod, whom he had prepared to annihilate in Year 6, was industriously annihilating himself. Before the eyes of Rome, many thousands of Germans were dying -- at the hands of other Germans! Rome did not have to bloody its hands or sacrifice a single legion. The barbarians were carrying out the horrendous slaughter with their customary pigheadedness and dogged thoroughness, with a true “furor teutonicus” on both sides. Such a tragedy! Rome was jubilant. For many centuries the Germans would continue to experience the same sad spectacle of war among brothers. German history is filled with it.

 

Thus sank Arminius’ elaborate plan for unity, because neither he nor Marbod would be a brother to the other.

 

The terrible war was not truly decisive. Marbod, who had attacked Arminius, was forced to call back his Marcomanni into defensive positions, while Arminius’ troops were too decimated and exhausted to pursue him. When Marbod’s forces defected en masse to Arminius’ side, Marbod was forced to retreat to his mountain fortress in Bohemia, where he was militarily and politically impotent.

 

With this, Ingomer’s dream of being national king of the Cheruskans was also at an end. Henceforth he could do nothing except stay underground and occasionally attack from ambush.

 

In the same year as the great Marcomann War (was it irony or coincidence?), Germanicus staged his triumphal entry into Rome. He had not really earned a triumph, but Emperor Tiberius graciously granted him a dazzling ceremony before sending him into the desert, where he disappeared from the world scene.

 

Marbod was left standing with his back to the wall. He desperately needed military assistance in order to survive. Abandoned by all his friends, he was forced to flee to Rome and beg for assistance. He probably expected that they would reward his neutrality during the Pannonian War.

 

Their response was typically Roman, however. Like they had done once before, they denied his request, saying that he had no right to protection because he had never supported Rome militarily. They did not acknowledge his good conduct in the past. Now, when he could neither help nor hurt them, they cold bloodedly dropped him.

 

_________ annihilate the falling ruler and banish the chronic threat to its northeastern borders. They bribed a certain Catualda, an exiled Marcomann who had sought asylum among the Goths, and provided him with a sizeable force. Marbod’s nobility then assisted Catualda in entering his castle, so that Marbod was forced to flee over the Danube and beg asylum from his deadly foe Tiberius. Even in this hopeless situation, which must have been deeply mortifying for such a proud and arrogant man, Marbod never lost his regal bearing. He reminded Tiberius that he had always sought the friendship of Rome and given it priority, while other countries were assiduously courting his favor. We can be sure that he did not fail to mention Arminius’ numerous attempts to woo him away from Rome.

 

Tiberius proved to be generous. He alloted Marbod a villa in Ravenna that was appropriate to his station, a comfortable exile for this royal asylum seeker without lands or power. Arminius’ wife Thusnelda and little son Thumelicus lived as captives in the same city. We wonder if Marbod ever saw them or spoke to them.

 

We can be certain of one thing: Tiberius did not accomodate Marbod out of the goodness of his heart. He probably intended to keep the Marcomann king as a political chess piece in case opportunities should arise. No such opportunity ever arose, however.

 

Marbod outlived Arminius by 16 years. The jubilant Romans would certainly have informed him of the violent death of his erstwhile rival, but it was probably of little interest to him. At most, the news could provide some tardy satisfaction in his dreary emigrant’s existence. It might well be that he, the once-feared mighty king who had commanded hundreds of thousands, but was now powerless and doomed to idleness, envied the feckless Cheruskan his death at the height of his fame.

 

Marbod spent 18 years in his Italian exile. In the year 37 he died at age 81, bitter, forgotten and ignored by the world. Tiberius, the man who had been his greatest enemy, died in the same year. He was no less abandoned and dishonored.

 

Arminius and Marbod

 

The lives of Arminius and Marbod are fatally and tragically intertwined, both in their similarities and dissimilarities. They both came of noble families and were endowed with Germanic Heil (salvation, well being and good fortune) that could be granted only by the gods. Both were educated in Rome and probably grew up there. Both developed into most significant and outstanding German leaders of the First Century.

 

Both struggled to extend the Germanic regions and to establish a firm coalition of the individual and disunited tribes. One of them devoted his life to liberating his homeland from foreign domination, the other to his own personal aggrandizement.

 

If the two had only realized the greatness and grandeur of combining forces and acting in consert, they would have had the power to decisively change political relations in Germania and the Germany that succeeded it, for many centuries and to the benefit of all Germans. The fact that they failed to do this is the tragedy of these two most significant personalities. Instead of joining forces they became opponents, rivals, and finally deadly enemies.

 

They are symbolic figures of the eternal Germanic tragedy of disunity and self-destruction that has been repeated constantly in German history.

 

Germanicus

 

Germanicus was the son of the elder Claudius Nero Drusus, nephew and adopted son of Emperor Tiberius, husband of the granddaughter of Emperor Augustus, Agrippina. Born in 15 BC, he was one year younger than Arminius. He is described by his contemporaries as an attractive, friendly and accomodating young man of impressive physique who was dignified and generous. He was also considered overly ambitious for power and glory.

 

In the year 13 he was given the governorship of Gaul, at the same time that he took over command of eight legions along the Rhine.

 

Footnote: These were the lst and 20th Legions from Ara (Cologne) as well as the 5th and 21st from Castra Vetera along the Lower Rhine and the 2nd, 13th, 14th and 16th from the Upper Rhine.

 

In 14 AD Augustus died at age 76 and Tiberius became his successor. In the same year, Germanicus crossed the Rhine from his headquarters in Cologne with the goal of completing Drusus’ conquests in the part of Germania that was still unoccupied and extending the eastern border of the Empire to the Elbe. He was equally determined to revenge the so-called “Shame of Varus:” He was supposed to smooth over the moral scar of the lost Varus battle by wiping out Arminius and the Cheruskans.

 

In the eyes of the Romans, his name Germanicus (meaning “German tamer”) vouched for the success of the undertaking, in which he hoped to win military fame as a brilliant field commander. The hopes of the entire empire were resting on him. Apparently he conducted war even without authorization, that is, on his own hook. It seems he was attempting to profile himself, as did Julius Caesar. Probably even then he was acting under a pronounced persecution complex.

 

During the years 14 –16, Germanicus initiated three major campaigns of conquest and revenge against the Rhine-Weser Germans. These were grandiose offensives conducted with huge expenditures of men and materiel. He was motivated primarily by the compulsion to totally defeat the unconquered portion of Germania and to kill or capture the hated “traitor” Arminius. He wantonly employed the tactics of genocide and “scorched earth” against against the Maser, Charten and Brukterer tribes.

 

In the year 16, the third and final year of the war, he enjoyed a number of successes, thanks to his overwhelming military and material superiority over the much smaller forces of the German tribes. He certainly “won” two battles (at Idistaviso and the Agrivarier Wall) but he failed to win the war. He suffered several near-defeats that were potentially as disastrous as the Varus battle, from which he was saved only by disunity and hesitation among the tribes of the Germans.

 

Germanicus came nowhere near achieving the main objective of the campaigns with the ruinous expenditures of money and blood “Operation Elbe Border.” In fact he did not even succeed in eestablishing a Weser or Ems border.

 

One of his modest successes was the recovery of the legion standards taken by Arminius. With the recovery of these eagles he still could not heal the deep wounds of the Varus trauma that continued to fester in the heart of every Roman, but he could at least rationalize the enormous expenditure of his wars.

 

After the third failure of his nephew, when the experienced military leader Tiberius learned that Germanicus was actually experiencing nothing but failure in the most expensive military offensives of that day, despite his passionate ambitions, he finally had enough. He ordered the “German-tamer” to return immediately, before he could cause still greater damage, and relieved him of command.

 

There is no doubt that Prince Gaius Julius Caesar Germanicus was groomed and prepared to subsequently fill the highest state positions as well as exercise supreme military command. In Germania he was supposed to have gained the necessary experience as combat commander that so distinguished his uncle Tiberius.

 

Superficially, he possessed all the advantages that a nation could desire for its regent. Germanicus had a splendid appearance, representing the ideal type of youthful “go-getter.” His radiant personality alone could bring the masses to the point of jubilant hysteris when he appeared in public.

And yet, despite all the glitter, he lacked insight and perspective, especially in political matters. Where perception and perspective were concerned, his uncle as well as his opponent Arminius were vastly superior to him.

 

Consequently, he often acted without consideration and without contrtol, motivated by pure ambition and a blind thirst for glory. It seemed that Germanicus had no concept of reality. Often, when he attempted to achieve something by brute force, he was repulsed with heavy losses.

 

It is indisputable that he was brave and did not spare himself as a leader of troops. His much praised congenial nature, like his willingness to help, invite the conclusion that he was very fond of his soldiers and looked after them as best he could. He familiarized his son Caligula at a very early age with the soldier’s life.

 

Footnote: “Caligula” actually meant something like “little soldier’s boot,” a nickname the legionnaires gave the youngster because he was always wearing a child’s military uniform.

 

All this earned him great honor and distinction in the army and among the people. In their eyes he was the ideal ruler, in contrast to the brooding and unapproachable intellectual Tiberius.

 

Insofar as he was successful in the struggle against Arminius, Germanicus could thank his success primarily to the rigid military training and technological equipage of his troops; the superiority of his ballistic weapons; logistics; a network of fortifications; and an excellent intelligence system that made extensive use of indigenous spies, to name just a few of his countless advantages over his Germanic opponent.

 

We must also consider that Germanicus had at his disposal a reliable staff of experienced field grade officers tested by decades of military service, who gave him the benefit of their rich experience. This makes the military accomplishments of Arminius and his peasant warriors all the more impressive. Despite their inadequate numbers, they provided formidable opposition to these armored, technically superior, exquisitely trained elite troops of a highly civilized world empire. At the end of the Germanicus war, they were by no means defeated.

 

Germanicus was far from being a strategic ignoramus, even though in the end he was unsuccessful, as measured by the forces he utilized and the objectives he established. There can be no doubt that he understood his profession; and yet, with all the means at his disposal, he should have achieved a great deal more. After all is said and done, the only thing that matters is success -- and his success was modest indeed. Despite the “Blitzkrieg” tactics he employed against the Marser, Brukterer and Chatten tribes, despite the wholescale slaughter and awful devastation, he was unable to change the situation politically or militarily.

 

Germanicus was the typical field commander who was unlucky in war. Martial luck can never be forced, even with the greatest effort and ambition.

 

Germanicus’ Leading Officers Whose Names Have Been Passed Down to Us

 

Aulos CAECINA:

Old and experienced trooper with title of field commander. With forty years of service, he retained control even in hopeless situations and he always kept a cool head. He was Germanicus’ most competent and important field officer.

Publius VITELLIUS:

A field grade officer and legate (official emissary)

Caius SILIUS:

A field grade officer, legate and naval expert

Lucius STERTINIUS:

A legate and cavalry commander

PEDO:

Head of mounted troops

ANTEIUS:

A staff officer and builder of the transport fleet

Seius TUBERO:

A legate and cavalry commander at Angrivarier-Wall

AEMILIUS:

A primipilar (captain of a vanguard) who was a long serving and trusted Centurion of the 1st Centurie of a legion, a leader of mounted troops.

Gaius CAETRONIUS:

A legate of the 1st Legion of the Rhine

Lucius APRONIUS:

A legate of praetorian rank and the governor of the province of Lower Germania.

FLAVUS:

“The blonde haired one,” brother of Arminius and prefect of a Germanic auxiliary unit.

CHARIOVALDA:

The name means “herald. He was a leader of the Bataver tribe and commander of an auxiliary unit from the netherlands. He was killed following the crossing of the Weser in Year 16.