Retaliation

 

On the return march from the Varus battlefield, Germanicus, in his frenzied desire for revenge, allowed Arminius to entice him further and further into difficult terrain. When a Roman cavalry unit was about to close with the Germans, he disappeared with a pivoting as though fleeing into thick woods, into which no riders could follow. At that instant, fresh groups of warriors who had been lying in ambush come storming into their flanks, thoroughly confusing the mounted Romans and compelling them to flee.

 

The cohorts marching behind the cavalry were quickly caught up in a panic. Again, Arminius had chosen terrain that allowed him to drive part of the fleeing Romans into a large bog. It required the arrival of fresh legionnaires in battle formation to avoid calamity and stem the flight.

 

Whenever Tacitus describes the outcome of a fight as “indecisive,” as he does here, it means that he does not want to admit a defeat. The truth is that this action meant another serious blunder on the part of the Romans.

 

For the return march of the first army group, as on the advance march, four legions (around 25,000 men) were loaded onto ships at the Ems. Two of these legions were under the command of Germanicus and two under the legate Publius Vitellius. The cavalry units were supposed to initially accompany the river transport and then follow the North

Sea coast back to their home garrison.

 

Later on, both Vitellius legions had to disembark and continue their return march on foot. What caused Germanicus to take this unusual measure? Because of the low water level of the river, he wanted to facilitate water transport so that the boats would float at low (ebb) tide. With the rising tide he would take the men on board again. This decision, which was correct in itself, would later cause serious consequences for the army group.

 

Because Arminius already controlled the better road, the second army group (four legions, 25,000 men) had to follow the route over the so-called Pontes Longi (“Long Bridges”), a causeway with corduroy road somewhere in the Burtnager Marsh. This was an old causeway, 80-100 kilometers long, that had been built twenty years before by the Roman governor Dominicus Ahenobarbus.

 

Extending from the Ems to the Rhine through a desolate marsh region, it had deteriorated badly in the intervening years.

 

In view of the great risk and responsibility involved in leading such a large force with unwieldly baggage train over such an unsecure route, the choice of leadership fell on Germanicus’ most competent and experienced field officer, General Caecina. He was given strict orders to pass over the marsh bridges as quickly as possible in order to elude Arminius. His goal was his home garrison Castra Vetera (Xanten). We can be sure that this practical minded old soldier was not enthusiastic about such an impossible mission.

 

When Caecina arrived at the beginning of the causeway he discovered that watery bogs extended a long distance on both sides of the embankment and that the road was in very poor condition.

 

By means of forced marches on paths known only to the Germans, Arminius in the meantime had moved ahead of the heavily laden legionnaires, who were furthered hindered by their baggage train. His lightly armed warriors were waiting in ambush in the marsh woods.

 

When his scouts reported this to Caecina, he became uncertain about how to proceed. What should he do first – repair the causeway or attack Arminius? Both missions contradicted his orders, which were to elude the Cheruskan with quick marches. Now he was faced with a new situation and he had to come up with a new plan. In view of the unfavorable situation, he decided to halt and build a camp where he was. For the moment, that was the best thing he could do. He hoped that Arminius would not dare to attack, once he was in a defensive position.

 

It would seem to be an impossible task to build a camp for 25,000 men in the middle of a marsh, but Caecina completed it, although with very great difficulties. The trenches immediately filled with water. For walls the legionnaires had to use sod and tree limbs, which provided little protection. While the entrenchments were being built, engineer units were sent ahead to repair the road.

 

This could not have been more than a pathway of sticks and beech saplings. The troops sent to protect the road workers were under constant attack. Familiar with the terrain, lightly armed and unburdened, the Germans allowed the struggling Romans no respite.

 

The engineers suffered most, since their wounded had to be abandoned in the bogs. The legionnaires were looking forward to the night, but even then Arminius spread confusion through feint attacks that kept the camp on constant alert.

 

In order to increase their misery, he gave orders to flood the legionnaires’ encampment by damming and diverting the brooks and water course around the camp. The legionnaires working on the entrenchments sank in the mud, while those with shields and armor were practically defenseless. A calamity was developing that was not unlike that of Varus.

 

Caecina, the iron leader who had risen from the ranks and grown grey in forty years of war, was no Varus, however. He did not lose his nerve. Again he did exactly the right thing and managed to escape the watery trap. He formed two groups that protected his flanks long enough to give the wounded and the baggage train a small head start, while a third group kept the attackers at a distance. In this way he was able to win breathing space and avoid the danger posed by this stretch of terrain.

 

Again he succeeded in setting up an emergency camp for the night, which for the Romans was again sleepless and filled with alarms. Caecina must have been preoccupied with thoughts of Varus’ defeat. Just as in Year 9, the Germans were again singing their victory songs and were confident of success.

 

When morning broke, Caecina received the disastrous news that both legions protecting his flanks had disobeyed orders, abandoned their positions and left in the direction of the Rhine. Caecina had no choice except to continue his march.

 

Arminius still declined attacking with his main force. He wanted to proceed very carefully and so he waited until man, horse and wagon were all completely bogged down in the ruts and mudholes of the poorly repaired corduroy road. When he was convinced of this, he ordered his men to storm the Romans.

 

Panic quickly broke out. The legionnaires ceased to obey orders and instinctively resorted to the age-old dictum of self preservation, “every man for himself.”

 

For Arminius, the battle of the marsh bridges was a repeat of the Varus battle, except that there were four legions this time.

 

With a band of hand-picked warriors he broke through the ring of desperate defenders and wreaked havoc, especially among the mounted troops, by attacking their horses. The terrified animals panicked, threw off their riders and slipped and slid in the slippery marsh paths, trampling the wounded legionnaires.

 

It was an effective if less-than-cavalierly tactic. Caecina’s horse was killed, and fell on top of him. At the last moment his men were able to rescue him, and so he was spared the fate of Varus.

 

With utmost effort a few groups were able to collect and hold together around the eagles and unit standards. It was here that the battle raged most fiercely, since Arminius had promised a great reward to whoever would be able to seize one of these greatly prized trophies.

 

At the end of the battle, however, victory did not go to the real victors. The ancient Germanic lack of discipline and hunger for loot robbed them of their victory; and instead of finishing off the Romans, they threw themselves upon the baggage train with its immense riches. Their main attack stagnated and came to a standstill. Arminius raged and bellowed, but to no avail: he was unable to override the urge to plunder.

 

When the Germans turned to looting the baggage train, Caecina exploited the opportunity to fight his way out of the deadly bog and onto firmer ground. On the evening of the third day of battle he succeeded in again erecting an emergency-fortified camp, even though he had nothing left with which to build it. Almost all the Romans’ tools, provisions and medical supplies had been lost in the tumult.

 

The last rations were distributed, even though they were spoiled by mud and water. Hardly any of the thousands of legionnaires expected to survive the disaster. Despite everything, this rock-hard old general Caecina succeeded in driving his exhausted men to superhuman effort by reminding them of the bloody fate of Varus’ legions. Although his soldiers had only a few remaining tools, he motivated them to somehow cut down and erect trees for palisades during the night, a masterful feat of command for this outstanding old soldier. Again, nobody was able to sleep.

 

Panic and unfounded rumors continued all night as constant cries of “The Germans are coming!!” resounded through the camp. The Germans however were preoccupied with their massive booty and with celebrating their victory before they had completely won it.

 

Even in this seemingly hopeless situation, Caecina never gave up. He assembled his troops and calmly made clear to them that nothing except a massive, tightly organized breakthrough offered any hope of escape. Individual actions and blind flight would be completely pointless, with no chance whatever of success. Furthermore, dissention now developed on the German side. Arminius wanted to wait and see what the Romans would do, since they could not hold out for long without food; but his uncle Ingomer insisted on an immediate assault on all sides.

 

Because Arminius had to share command with the older man, and because most of the warriors impetuously prefered Ingomer’s bolder and more daring plan, he had to relent and go along with it. They filled the trenches with bundles of branches, and the first waves of daring warriors were able to climb over the wall, which was thinly manned. Caecina however had massed most of the legionnaries behind the gates, waiting for the right moment to counterattack. While most of the Germans were clamboring over the pointed palisade and unable to fight, Caecina gave the order for an all-out assault.

 

The Romans, who just a short time before had been on the verge of panic, now found courage and attacked from the rear, while the overconfident Germans suffered heavy losses.

 

Ingomer was seriously wounded and Arminius, who was not injured, did not spare the old warhorse bitter reproaches. Because of the serious setback, he ordered his fighters to break off contact.

Only remnants of the legions that had set out succeed in reaching the security of the left bank of the Rhine. Here, Agrippina receives the survivors on the bridge.

 

Caecina then succeeded in leaving camp with his hungry and exhausted men. They were forced to move quickly, since they had no provisions at all, and he convinced his troops that anyone who lay down was a dead man. The Germans, who were as exhausted as the Romans, set about plundering the camp. It appears that Arminius made no further attempts to attack.

 

Thanks to his uncle’s impetuousness he had not succeeded in totally annihilating Caecina’s legions, which had seemed assured, but he had so weakened the Romans that he could consider the battle a great victory.

 

Wounded, demoralaized and at the end of their strength, the badly defeated and decimated remnants of Caecena’s four legions eventually made their way to the Rhine.

 

The rumor had already spread that the Roman army had been annihilated and the Germans were coming to invade the west bank of the Rhine. Panik broke out in Castra Vetera. The legionnaires there began pulling down the Rhine bridge without regard for the returnees, for whom destruction of the bridge would have meant certain death.

 

At the last minute Agrippina, the high-spirited wife of Germanicus, succeeded in halting destruction of the bridge. No doubt she was thinking of her husband, who was still returning with the fleet. She knew that he would not have agreed to destroy the bridge under any circumstances.

Footnote: There is an interesting connection between Agrippina and the name of the city of Köln (Cologne.) The daughter of Agrippina (who later became empress), gave to the capitol of the west bank of Rhine, Germanic UBIER / the noble name of a Roman colony in order to honor her place of birth, ARA (Latin for “Altar”). Subsequently the name “Köln” (Cologne) was derived from this. The complete name was COLONIA CLAUDIA AUGUSTA ARA AGRIPPINENSIUM.

 

With her young son Caligula, she stood at the head of the bridge and greeted the dishevelled, ragged and wounded groups of soldiers. She saw to it that their wounds were treated and that they were fed and given new uniforms. She proved herself a true and competent soldier’s wife (and soldier’s mother.)

 

Tiberius, who loathed Germanicus and Agrippina, was greatly angered by the fact that she was giving orders to surviving legionnaires on the authority of her husband. Among the Romans, it was completely unheard of that a woman should do such a thing. He interpreted her concern and assistance as “glory grabbing” or common “flirting” with the legionnaires. He had long disapproved of her living in the legionnaire camp rather than in Rome or the elegant Tivoli. The fact that even a small part of the army returned to the service of the Emperor was owing entirely to the outstanding performance of Caecina.

 

Footnote: Caecina’s Triumph. The fact that such honors were reserved exclusively for the emperor or princes of his house indicates the great distinction bestowed on the general.

 

Without him, Germanicus would have suffered a defeat even worse than that of Varus. For his outstanding leadership, the general was immediately honored with the insignia of Triumphator, which he richly deserved.

 

It was only because of the resolute actions of his wife that any of Caecina’s men were able to reach the safety of the west bank of the Rhine.

 

While this was going on, Vitellius and his two legions made good progress after having left the ships on solid ground and in dry weather. His transport ships and sailors had travelled downstream to where they were supposed to take him on board in deeper water.

 

It is not clear from Tacitus’ reports why Germanicus, who commanded the entire fleet, had given Vitellius alone the order to proceed on foot in order to lighten the transport ships, while he himself continued in the ships. Had the Germans perhaps destroyed some of the transport ships at anchor while the legions were fighting in the interior, so that there were not enough ships for all the men and materiel?

Vitellius was unfamliar with the treacherous northern tidelands. While approaching the fleet, he ran into a rapidly approaching equinoctial storm accompanied by deep and rapidly advancing tide. In the blink of an eye, he found himself and his 12,000 men cut off from the mainland by deep gullies and swirling rip currents, literally up to his neck in water! In the gathering northern storm, with waves as high as a man, his entire command, including wagons and draft animals, was thrown into complete confusion. They were completely at the mercy of the elements. Entire units sank in the churning rapids, from which there was no escape.

 

When the storm subsided, Vitellius and his men finally found solid ground again and assembled in a somewhat higher area. After roll call he determined that he had lost several cohorts, his entire baggage train with all his engineering equipment and a great part of his heavy weapons. His losses would not have been greater if he had lost a major battle.

 

The soaked legionnaires spent the night with no fire, no food and no water. Nearly all of them were half naked, having lost their weapons, shields and armor when the flood roared in. Many were injured and all were soaked, shivering, terrified and filled with despair as they awaited the dawn. When daylight came and the storm subsided, they made their way to the mouth of the river. Germanicus now arrived with the fleet and took the survivors on board.

 

Wild rumors, probably spread by the Frisians, quickly began circulating about their misfortune. On the Rhine, rumor was that Germanicus with his entire army had been drowned in the North Sea. This of course was not true, but the survivors were at the end of their strength and endurance when the fleet finally arrived at its home harbors of Vetera (Xanten) and Ara (Köln).

 

Following the debacles of his pursuit of Arminius, Caecina’s costly battles at the marsh bridges and Vitellius’ calamitous flood, Germanicus came under intense pressure. His losses of men, animals, war materiel and provisions were so heavy that Gaul, Spain and Italy were hard pressed to replace them with special levies of weapons, horses and money.

 

In order to hide from the emperor the actual extent of the setback or failure, as well as the seriousness of the situation, Germanicus compensated all the soldiers who had lost their pay and their savings from his own pocket. This generous gesture must have cost him a huge fortune. In addition, he personally looked after the sick and wounded, showing himself in exemplary fashion to be concerned about his soldiers’ welfare. This of course greatly increased his prestige and popularity among his troops.

 

Needless to say, Tiberius soon learned through his informers about the complete lack of success and costly undertakings of Year 15 and made his displeasure known to Germanicus. He was coming to realize that his nephew was a hopeless commander whose wars in Germania would always be extremely risky and expensive.

 

This of course spurred Germanicus to find a new way to successfully conclude the war and to determine what additional measures would be required and persuade his uncle to adopt them. He was under tremendous pressure to show progress. It was clear that Tiberius had become very critical of him, and that the only way he could win the emperor’s approval to continue the war was to convince him with practical and logical arguments.

 

Germanicus was not a man who gave up easily. The ambitious young prince was determined to continue his war and win his victory and, above all, eternal fame and renown.

 

He then presented to the emperor his ideas about how he wanted to continue the struggle in Germania, particularly the war against Arminius. In order to justify the additional huge costs, he skilfully presented his plans in the context of the emperor’s relentless misgivings about the threat from the north.

 

His main argument was that under no circumstances should the war be discontinued on account of the “bad luck” that he had encountered. He said that if Tiberius should discontinue the war, it would lead to closer cooperation between Arminius in the northwest and Marbod in the southeast of Germania, who would then combine to attack Rome. Such a danger would have unforeseeable consequences for the Empire, therefore it had to be met with complete decisiveness and by all means available.

 

He said that from his own experience he had learned four important things.

 

In the first place, any campaign in Germania would have to be dependent on construction of secure roads or marching routes.

 

Secondly, the Germans could be defeated only in open terrain. Rome would never defeat them in impenetrable forests, mountains and marshes, where the legionnaries suffered more from attrition than from enemy action.

 

Thirdly, any military action or campaign should be ended in three months or less; and each soldier should be given provisions every 4 or 5 days -- the soldiers should not be required to carry more than that. This implied that in order to provision 90,000 men and 20,000 cavalry horses, the army would need a giant baggage train of 9,000 wagons with drivers and necessary escort as well as 17,000 draft horses and pack animals.

 

Footnote: Frontinus, a military historian who lived from 40-105, wrote in

DE RE MILITARI ROMANORUM: “The thing that most hinderd Drusus,

Tiberius and Germanicus on German soil was the problem of supply.”

 

Fourth, this excessively long supply train would be exposed to constant attacks, therefore the army’s supply line would constantly be endangered on the land route. He pointed out that overland transport depended on draft animals, and Gaul’s supply of hourses was exhausted.

 

For all these reasons he planned to solve the problem of transporting supplies by carrying them on ships on the rivers of Germania.

 

Proceeding from this consideration, Germanicus wanted to achieve a double effect this time: he wanted to go a step further and ship the entire army with all its weapons and heavy equipment by way of water. After all, he said, both mighty Caesar and mighty Tiberius, as well as Drusus, had transported infantry and cavalry by sea and river in similar fleets and had achieved success! This time, all the foregoing technical and nautical experiences of the preceding operations, especially construction of special ships, would be consistently studied and applied. In this way, powerful forces could penetrate deep into enemy country undetected, which would lessen attrition. The troops would arrive in the enemy’s homeland fresh and rested, not exhausted and weakened by bloody losses. In addition, the Romans would be able to wage war earlier in the year, since they would not have to wait until the muddy roads and pathways of north Germania were passable.

 

In order to accomplish all this, it would be necessary to build around 1,000 ships. There was no alternative. In addition, the fleet itself, merely through the unprecedented number of ships, would be a powerful demonstration of the power of the empire that would awe and terrify the Germans. With this innovative new plan, Germanicus intended to deliver a unique and annihilating surprise blow that Arminius and his army could not possibly survive.

 

Tiberius, a distinguished military leader who was familiar first hand with the Germans, and particularly experienced in naval operations, would not have agreed to such a stupendous construction project if he had not considered it very closely. He could not refute or ignore Germanicus’ arguments. If he could have foreseen the sad end of this huge fleet, he would most certainly have withheld his approval and financial support, and would have ordered his nephew to forego additional offensives in Germany.