The Great Battle

 

As it entered the third year, Germanicus knew that this war – his war – would not be over until Arminius, whose position was growing ever more formidable, had been utterly defeated. Germanicus felt that he absolutely had to be victorious.

 

The mostly negative course of Year 15 had threatened Roman hegemony on the Rhine and with it the security of the border. This was probably the main reason why Tiberius reluctantly allowed his uncongenial nephew to make one more attempt.

 

This time Germanicus wanted to operate with not just half an army, as he had done before, but with three times the size of the army that had been available to Varus, 90,000 men at arms, exclusive of the baggage train.

 

It was the greatest expeditionary force that would ever penetrate into the North. The size of the forces involved, which was unsurpassed in those days, illustrates Germanicus’ determination, in the wake of his heretofore modest “successes”, to force final victory at all costs. He was prepared to use every imaginable means, primarily massive and overwhelming amounts of men and materiél.

 

In the parlance of today, it might have been said: “Don’t pussyfoot around -- sock it to him!” It is the method of fighting wars that has characterzed the Americans from the first and second world wars to Vietnam and the Gulf war.

 

In the early Summer of Year 16, when all the troops, materiél, horses and provisions of this army had been exquisitely organized, brought to the highest level of proficiency, finally loaded on board -- an excellent accomplishment of Roman organization -- the stupendous fleet finally collected along the lower Rhine.

 

There, Germanicus once again prayerfully invoked the spirit of his dead father Drusus, who had once reached the Elbe, and implored for his assistance in the forthcoming offensive.

 

The fleet moved through the “Drusus Canal,” then along the coast, and then it entered the mouths of the rivers that would take them deep into enemy territory.

 

It is not clear from historical sources whether Germanicus used the Ems or the Weser. If one wants to penetrate deep into the heart of Cherusker territory, the Weser is logically more advantageous than the Ems, for the above mentioned reasons. This is all the more plausible for the simple reason that Germanicus expressly names the Weser as the first objective of the invasion. His plan was to assault the main objective, the Elbe, after the Weser had been secured.

 

In order to mask the main attack from the northern sea route, Germanicus initiated a deceptive maneuver by sending his generals Stertinius and Silius to invade the lands of the Chatten, Brukterer and Marser tribes. This was supposed to make Arminius believe that the main attack would come from there. At the same time it was supposed to alarm his allies and keep them in place so that they could not assist Arminius.

 

This operational plan, concocted in the best fashion of Roman general staffs, assumed that Arminius would divide his main force or at least move to oppose the Romans’ secondary attack. This would allow them to catch him in a pincers movement with their main force, which was moving up the Weser to his rear. As soon as the Cheruskans were crushed, they would be unopposed in occupying Germania all the way to the Elbe and extending their eastern borders.

 

Arminius of course knew all along about the approach of the thousand ships, and so the Romans lost the element of surprise. He saw through their deceptive maneuver right away.

 

In the time remaining to him, he positioned his main force where the main attack would logically occur: the right bank of the Weser, from where ran the shortest connecting route to the East. That is the area around Porta Westfalica.

 

To be sure, he was facing a daunting, very unequal fight with a splendidly equipped and numerically overwhelming force. Unless he could avoid defeat by means of a strategically brilliant and masterful chess move, it could only end in decisive defeat for the Cheruskans.

The fact that the Roman army acted exactly as Arminius anticipated it would act gives further evidence of his uncanny ability to think and act logically and consistently. When Germanicus arrived at the fords near the Gateway on the left bank of the Weser, his eight legions set up their camps -- a huge mass of men, animals and baggage trains. Until such time as a bridge was built, these camps were probably located along the left Weser in a line extending from Mindenfurt to the northern rim of the Wieher mountain range, on the elevated Weser Terrace. We assume that their main supply depot was nearby. From this depot, the Romans would logically have supplied their advance as part of “Operation Elbe.”

 

Probably it was here, on the banks of the Weser, that the dramatic meeting and confrontation between Arminius and his brother Flavus “Blonde Hair” took place before the beginning of combat operations. Flavus, we recall, was an officer of auxiliaries in the Roman army. As soon as Arminius was informed that Germanicus had arrived on the left bank of the Weser, he requested through an intermediary permission to speak to his brother.

 

Among the legionnaires’ numerous tools and implements, the DOLABRA, a practical combination of pick and mattock, was of the most important instruments used to construct walls and dig trenches.

 

It has been said that after the GLADIUS (short sword of the legionnaires), the Roman army owed its military successes primarily to this construction implement.

 

Without the DOLABRA, many a victory that won by the construction of camps and trenches would not have been possible.

 

What motivated Arminius to request this meeting with Flavus? Certainly the family bond would have been a principal factor; in addition to this, the two brothers had not seen each other for ten years since the Balkan war. In those days they had been fighting together under Tiberius. Now they were enemies. Since that time, fateful Year 9 had occurred, after which nothing could ever again be the same.

 

Did Arminius want to appeal to the heart of this man who had been born of the same mother -- appeal to the German heart beneath the Roman armor? Now that he, Arminius, was highly esteemed and greatly respected by friend and foe alike, did he hope to persuade Flavus to cross over to the side where he rightly belonged? This was very probably his main intention. Furthermore it would have gone against all his instincts of family and kinship to have to confront his beloved brother and former war comrade with sword in hand. Perhaps he still nurtured the fond hope that Flavus had undergone a change of heart after the defeat of Varus and secretly made up his mind to change sides.

 

They agreed on a meeting place on the Weser, with Flavus on the left bank and Arminius on the right bank. Germanicus graciously granted his approval. Was he perhaps hoping for a peaceful conquest of the Cheruskans by Arminius’ “Roman” brother, as a result of this meeting? Whoever would have hoped for such a thing did not know Arminius very well...

 

When Flavus appeared with a bodyguard of archers, Arminius requested that they go away, since he wanted to speak with his brother privately, with no weapons present. Flavus sent his guards away, and the brothers inspected each other closely after many years of separation. What must have been their thoughts?

 

Arminius immediately noticed a severe disfiguration in the face of his brother: Flavus had lost an eye.

 

Arminius asked him how when and where the injury occurred. He was very interested in this, since he was intimately familiar with the locations where Flavus had fought. Flavus answered him calmly and objectively, since he considered his injury an honorable war wound. Arminius then provoked him by asking about his compensation for the loss of eye. Flavus proudly pointed to the silver medals on his armor, his rings of honor, and the diadem on his helmet. He informed his brother of the amount of his monetary compensation and his promotion by the commandant. Arminius then laughed derisively across the river, saying this was a miserly reward, as befitted a henchman of Rome! Flavus grew furious and began to boast about the grandeur and majesty of the Empire, for which it was entirely fitting to make sacrifices. He told Arminius that Rome was generous toward everyone who submitted to its rule and placed himself under its protection, while its defeated enemies could expect no mercy.

 

As as example of Rome’s mercy and generosity, he told Arminius that Thusnelda had been treated with compassion, not like an enemy. With this, Flavus struck the wounded heart of his brother. Shouting angrily across the water, Arminius asked if it was Flavus’ idea of compassion to violently seize a defenseless pregnant woman and drag her from her home?

He grew more and more agitated, and appealed to Flavus to consider the God-given right to be free. He implored him to think of their homeland and their mother, who longed for his return and did not want him to betray kin and Volk. Then he made him a direct and startling offer: “You should become the leader of our people instead!”

 

Flavus, who had never considered whether he was on the right side or not, even in Year 9, reacted strongly when he was urged to shamefully desert and defect. Trembling with anger, he called for his sword: Arminius had clearly touched the rawest nerve in the body of his “recreant” brother. Now he, too, began yelling for a sword, as both brothers abandoned all their fraternal and chivalric instincts. One insult called forth another. In order to stigmatize his brother as a flunky of Rome, Arminius roared out the vilest Roman insults he knew. Had the river not been between them, and had not friends come running up to restrain them, they would both have jumped into the water and duelled to the death.

 

When Flavus finally withdrew under a deluge of insults Arminius announced that the battle had begun: “From now on, only our weapons will speak for us!” Nothing could better illustrate the crux of Germanic disunity than this bellicose exchange of words between two brothers!

 

From a secured bridgehead on the west bank, Germanicus then ordered his engineers to build a pontoon bridge across the river.

 

While the bridge and camp were still under construction, he received the unwelcome news that the Angrivar tribe from the area of the lower Weser, which had been allied with Rome, had defected and presumably joined the Cheruskans. This was a tactical move by Arminius that had been designed to threaten his enemy’s rear even before the battle began.

 

Germanicus was forced to act quickly before the “insurgents” could plunder his rear echelon supply depots and interrupt his entire supply line. He dispatched the notorious General Stertinius with his cavalry corps, known to be particularly ruthless. Given the mission of punishing the insurrectionists, Stertinius destroyed the Angrivar settlements and massacred their inhabitants.

 

In order to divide the Germanic forces that, by now, had taken up battle formations on the other bank and were threatening the bridge, Germanicus initially sent three mounted detachments to attack sections that appeared to be weak. Then a Batavian (Dutch) elite cavalry unit, commanded by their duke Chariovalda, recklessly stormed the Germans where the current was strongest and Germanicus assumed the Cheruskans least expected an attack. The duke had the highly risky mission of protecting the bridgehead and reconnoitering the enemy lines. Pretending to take flight, mounted Cheruskans then enticed the Batavians into a clearing in the forest, where they surrounded and totally annihilated them. After valiantly defending himself Chariovalda also fell, along with his noble vassals.

 

Shortly after this came another heavy blow for the Imperator:

 

He discovered that he had enemies in the rear, which represented a dangerous threat to his supply fleet on the lower Weser. His illustrious Batavians have been annihilated to the last man. These were not good omens, considering that the real battle had not yet begun!

 

As soon as the pontoon bridge was completed, the advance legion and several auxiliary units marched across to the right bank, followed by the main army. They erected a bridgehead bastion and then the legions assumed their advance formations with mounted troops securing the flanks.

 

Before the real battle began, Germanicus performed a huge religious ceremony, as he was wont to do. He made offerings to the gods and prayed for victory and fame. The Immortals -- God Father, Providence and other holy personages -- always accompanied him on his campaigns! (Today as well, the good Lord is expected to fly along with electronically guided bombs and rockets in order to lend the trappings of a “just” war to bloody massacres, suggesting approval from on high...)

Since the auspices are favorable, Germanicus delivers a stirring speech to his assembled commanders and soldiers in which he explains his plans for the upcoming battle.

 

It has always been traditional at such ceremonies to depict the enemy in as bad light as possible, despite the fact that military leaders are doing their own “heroes” a disservice by belittling the enemy.

 

(Even today in US war movies, German soldiers of the Wehrmacht, who fought for six long years with such outstanding devotion to duty that Gen. Patton compared them to the Army of Northern Virginia, are represented as dolts and fools.) In keeping with tradition, Germanicus described the Germans as stupid and vulnerable showoffs who were poorly equipped and would quickly take to their heels at the first sign of misfortune. Then he appealed specifically to the mood of his mercenaries, which he understood very well: He said that if they wanted to put an end to the exertions of endless marches and dangerous sea voyages, they needed only to bravely follow him, because the Elbe was now closer than the Rhine. He assured them that victory was within their grasp.

 

In his speech to his army, Arminius likewise did not spare the extravagant words. These Roman troops, he declared, were survivors who had deserted from Varus’ army in the battle of Teutoburger Forest in Year 9. He accused them of bloody mutinies against their officers in order to avoid the front lines. He said they were the same Romans who had been routed under Caecina and Vitellius, and who carried scars on their backs for having fled in a cowardly manner -- the same Romans who in the North Sea storms had experienced the wrath of the Germanic gods! (Obviously Arminius was well informed about the mutiny of the Rhenic legions as well as the calamitous storm that destroyed Vitellius’ fleet.) He said the Romans had made the detour by way of the North Sea because they were trying to avoid meeting resistance on their arrival: in case they should lose the battle, they wanted to be able to escape quickly. Now however, in man-to-man combat, all their oars and sails would not be able to save them!

 

He said that the Roman officers were deceiving their soldiers when they urged them to fight for their Scholle, their homes and holy relicts, since none of these things belonged to them! He told his men that the Roman soldiers were fighting and dying for nothing except the possessions of the rich. He said they had separated from their families, driven by the cudgels of the centurions and beaten by the rods of the lictors, all for the sake of their rich rulers. As Tacitus reports in his Annals (II/15), Arminius told his men that in order to defeat the Romans, they needed only to remember the greed of the Romans for land. They should remember the Romans’ cruelty and arrogance! They must not forget that if they did not want to live as eternal slaves of Rome, there they had no choice except to either ensure their freedom or die a warrior’s death!

 

We do not have figures for the size of the German army, but Arminius cannot have had more than 20,000 warriors, in view of the Cheruskan population of around 50,000. He probably had around 30,000 allied troops as well. With regard to numbers, equipment and training, there can be no doubt that his fighting forces were vastly inferior to the Roman army. Thus, relative military strength was very unfavorable to the Germans. Nevertheless, he must have anticipated at least partial success, or else he would never have risked an encounter against such splendidly equipped and numerically superior forces -- and that in the open field! There can be no doubt that Arminius’ master command of tactics played a major part in the amazing chess move that followed.