Idistaviso

 

The decisive battle took place at Idistaviso on the Elfenwiesen* plain. According to the geographically vague Germanic descriptions on which ancient authors based their reports, the site of the battle was “between the Weser and a string of hills that follow one of the bends of the river.” If we take this ancient description literally, it eliminates the area northeast of Porta that was heretofore assumed to have been the battle site, since that site does not match the ancient description. There is one site that fits this description, however, if we consider in greater detail - the description found in Tacitus, who was describing the region from hearsay. Idistaviso Field could lie roughly along east-west Hellweg on a level stretch between the Weser mountain chain on the Porta and the forested hills west of Bückeburg. In Arminius’ day an arm of the Weser extended some distance to the east. In this landscape of scattered plains several obstructed creeks, which might have been artificially dammed, might have combined to form a larger body of water that in those days was also considered part of the Weser. If we take that into consideration, the description could apply.

 

Footnote: The translation of “Idistaviso” as “Elfenwiesen” is controversial and the two should not be considered identical, since the exact location is still not clear.

 

The somewhat similar sounding name of the village of Evesen as well as the ancient name “Dodtacker” meadow also strengthen the assumption that “Idistaviso” existed in the vicinity of Porta. The theory that we should look for “Idistaviso near Eisbergen” south of the Weser mountain chain seems quite feasible at first glance, but the terrain as it existed in those days, combined with several other factors, combine to argue against this idea.

 

Somewhere near here at any rate, on an elevation between the Weser River and Weser mountain range, the Romans encountered the Germans, who were deployed in some sort of battle formation. Such a formation was a great novelty for them.

 

Germanicus’ army was very strong numerically, surpassing every army he had ever before commanded. Altogether he had around 84,000 troops exclusive of baggage train, camp personnel and boat crews. His troops consisted of 1,000 Pretorian guards; 40,000 infantrymen (eight legions of around 5,000 men each); around 30,000 auxiliary units from Gaul, Batavia and Roman Germania; around 5,000 mounted German auxiliaries; 1,000 light mounted oriental archers, and the same number of archers on foot.

 

The Romans’ order of march was based on the usual formations of Agmen Quadratum, which was a complex and highly effective formation emphasizing compactness. A legion in this formation is best described as a well-oiled war machine. It was around 350 meters wide and 2,000 meters long. If for example two legions changed from march formation to battle formation**, the width of their front (including three mounted alen on each flank) came to around 1600 meters, while the depth of the formation, organized in several layers came to around 800 meters.

 

Footnote: ** The legions actually fought in a three layered battle formation, the so-called Acies triplex.]

 

In this formation the legions were arranged as on a chessboard with four cohorts in the first legion and three cohorts in the second and third legions.

To German eyes such a maneuver, which was carried out with extreme precision by means of acoustic and visual signals, must have provided a powerful and demoralizing martial spectacle.

 

The marching sequence was as follows:

 

The advance party consisting of cavalry units, archers and auxiliary infantry, which were sent out to reconnoitre the terrain and repulse initial attacks.

The vanguard, consisting of one legion chosen by lot and strengthened by a mounted troop which maintained liaison with the main army. In case of attack, this legion had the mission of offering resistance until the main force could arrive.

An engineer battalion whose task was to clear obstacles that might arise.

Ten men from each cohort, who carried tools for construction of the daily camp.

This was followed by the first four legions, headed by the standard bearers and the buglers, and directly behind these came the legionnaires, in ranks of four. Between the legions, always well protected, came a small equipment train.

Behind this came the officers and members of the commandant’s staff, protected by a strong mounted escort.

Then came Germanicus himself, on horseback, with his personal Praetorian guard.

Then came the nucleus of the heavy cavalry.

Then came the mules, hauling disassembled siege weapons and catapults.

Behind these came higher ranking officers, tribunes and auxiliary prefects with escort troops.

Then came the three remaining legions.

The entire march formation was flanked on both sides by 8 alen of cavalry (an ale consisted of 500 horsemen).

Then came the rear guard, which consisted of a strong contingent of heavily armed infantry, auxiliary units and cavalry. The mission of the rear guard was of course to protect the main force against attack from the rear, until it could made secure. The huge supply train was unprotected.

 

What was Arminius’ reaction when he beheld this huge force?

 

His tactical considerations are quite clear from the sequence of reports that have been handed down to us. It is obvious that he intended the following:

 

First of all, and for as long as possible, he would use small detachments to hinder the Romans from deploying into battle formations, thus delaying their advance. At the same time, his forces hurriedly dammed the numerous creeks and branches in the area.

His objective was also to mobilize the entire nation, so they would have time to prepare and move into defensive positions.

 

Appearing to retreat, he would then disengage from the enemy, regroup and augment his forces.

 

He would then attempt to trick Germanicus into changing the direction of his advance and thus compel him to change his plans.

 

By enticing Germanicus into pursuing him, he hoped to lead him into unfavorable terrain, where the Germans would occupy the favorable positions. From there, he would relentlessly harass and attack and weaken the Romans as much as possible.

 

From favorable defensive positions, the Germans would then engage the Romans with their main forces, including their Landsturm (“Home Guard”).

 

Whenerver possible, the Germans would disengage and disappear. Having disrupted the Romans’ original battle plans, they hoped to entice the enemy into pursuing them as far as possible from their supply bases while disrupting their supply lines.

 

Arminius had positioned his fighting forces on both sides of the Hellweg, along which Germanicus would have to advance.

 

The Romans’ highly disciplined battle formation was one of their principal advantages in the struggle against the fiery, individualistic and undisciplined German warriors.

 

The first group of warriors was waiting on the plain north of the march route, while a second group, the main force, which he himself led with his Cheruskans, was waiting south of the road, on the wooded crests of the Weser mountain chain, the Klushöhe, Harrl and Bückeberge. This is the site of the walled-in 200 acres of the “Nammer Base” which served as assembly point while offering flank cover.*

 

Footnote: * This was the largest walled enclosure in northern Germany. With its numerous natural springs, it could accomodate large numbers of people and animals.

 

The troops assembled on the plain were supposed to attack the Agmen at both both front and rear. Then they would attack the cohorts of auxiliaries. At that time Arminius, leading the main part of the German forces, would assault the columns in their flanks and engage them in hand-to-hand combat. In this way, he hoped to stop the Roman advance.

 

Arminius’ plan of action failed, probably due to the undisciplined conduct of the Germanic warriors. They charged too soon, in a blind fury, at the first glimpse of the Romans. Perhaps it was Ingomer who launched the premature attack and thus caused unnecessary casualties – this would have fit his nature.

 

Germanicus then ordered his cavalry to attack the enemy in his flank, which was the tactically correct thing to do. In the meantime, Stertinius was supposed to carry out an encircling maneuver with his mounted troops and attack the Germans from the rear. The fact that Stertinius had already returned from his punitive expedition strengthens our assumption that the land of the Agrivarii was not far distant from “Idistaviso.” Stertinius’ assault caused great confusion, and a critical situation developed for the Germans. The situation did not affect the outcome of the battle, however. With their storm troops, Arminius and Ingomer succeeded in breaking through the first four cohorts of Ratier, Vindelicier, Gauls and archers, even though they had been wounded while fighting in the front ranks. Far behind the enemy lines, Arminius found himself in grave danger. In order to avoid being recognized, he smeared his face with his own blood and trusted in the speed of his horse to break through the enemy lines, back to his own lines. He was lucky. The Chaukens, who occupied the region of East Frisian coast and lower Weser, had been subjugated and were now fighting on the Roman side. Although their chieftain was not allied with Rome, several of them recognized him and deliberately allowed him to pass through their ranks. It would have been easy for them to capture Arminius and it would have won them a huge reward. This was without doubt an act of Germanic solidarity!

 

Thus he was spared the fate of Versingetorix. Arminius enjoyed such popularity and prestige that he was highly venerated by the German mercenaries on the side of the Romans. Imagine how furious Germanicus must have been over this! He would have won his war immediately if he had been able to capture Arminius.

 

On the Roman side, the battle was fought almost exclusively by their auxiliary units. The iron block of legionnaires continued marching in tight ranks during the entire action: their tight battle formations were well nigh unassailable. One could indeed speak of a “marching battle” as far as they were concerned. Only the auxiliary troops of foreign nations suffered bloody losses. It was typical of the Roman method of conducting war that auxiliaries were always placed in front of the legions, where they had to absorb the main thrust of the enemy.

 

In hand-to-hand combat and engagements between cavalry units, the battle lasted from morning until nightfall. It is unlikely that it was really a “bloodless victory” for the Romans as they reported, however. Some very desperate actions and dramatic scenes occurred along one sretch of the Weser when the Roman cavalry cut off a detachment of Germans from their own lines and drove them into the river, where many of them drowned. Others, who tried to hide in trees, were shot down and killed by enemy archers.

 

In order to appreciate the German warriors’ heroic struggle, we have to keep in mind the great disparity in strength and numbers between the two sides. Tacitus wrote that enemy bodies and weapons covered the ground for a distance of 15 kilometers. What determined and self-sacrificing resistance the tribesmen put up in defense of their homeland!

 

At the end of the day Germanicus could report a “victory with few losses” for Rome, since only auxiliary troops had been engaged in the fighting. In addition, he had advanced 15 kilometers to the East, to the vicinity of today’s Obernkirchen, and so without doubt enjoyed an initial success. To his great disappointment, however, he realized that Arminius was not to be found among the enemy bodies. No one came forward to claim the huge reward he had placed on the German leader’s head.

 

Germanicus then had the weapons of the fallen Germans collected in a great triumphal mound atop an elevation, with the names of the “vanquished” tribes, as though he had already won the war.

 

The ancient historians reported that the sight of this triumphal mound did more to enrage the tribesmen and strengthen their resolve than did the losses they had suffered.

All those who had heretofore stood by as onlookers, whether young or old, simple folk or nobility, now spontaneously grabbed their weapons and, as Tacitus delicately reported, “spread consternation” among the Roman ranks.** It is more likely that a passionate appeal by Arminius for support in the decisive battle mobilized the last effort, a kind of home guard. Furthermore the massive German losses reported by the Romans could not have been as severe as they claimed.

 

Just a few days after the battle of Idistaviso, thousands of fresh German warriors were again assembled to oppose the invaders.

 

Germanicus, who believed Arminius to be wounded and retreating to the east, declared victory and had his soldiers render homage to Tiberius Imperator, since all wars were conducted under the auspices of the emperor god. Germanicus assumed that Arminius would continue trying to impede his march to the East with hit-and-run attacks on his marching columns and supply lines along the northern edge of the Weser mountain chain, Bückeberge and the Deister. He was confident the German leader would be unable to do much more than that.

 

What did Arminius actually do? He used the night to disengage from the enemy, gather and regroup his forces. He was not vanquished and defeated; he was still able to fight. He still had firm control of his troops. And now he did something that was completely unexpected. Arminius, who had appeared to be retreating to the east, suddenly turned north! With this tactical maneuver he suddenly threw the Romans’ entire operational concept into confusion. Germanicus was confronted with a new situation. He no longer had Arminius, whom he believed to be defeated and in disarray, in front of him. Now he had to make a 90 degree turn in order to pursue and finish off the hated Cheruskan. He suddenly realized that his entire “Operation Elbe” had been brought into question. He would have to vanquish Arminius and his army, and he would have to annihilate the entire nation if he wanted to continue his march to the Elbe and occupy the entire region.

 

Driven by ambition and the obsession to annihilate the enemy, he was forced to march with his legions wherever Arminius led. We ask ourselves: did Germanicus recall Varus’ fatal change of marching direction? Now he was repeatedly delayed by time-consuming forest skirmishes in which his troops were unable to deploy in battle formation. They were forced to stop. They suffered losses. He realized that he must not move too far from his supply fleet, which was lightly guarded. The fleet was probably anchored in the vicinity of Porta Westfalica, anticipating a continued advance to the east. If Germanicus should be cut off from the fleet, his entire campaign would be seriously threatened.

 

At this time he apparently received additional urgent letters from Tiberius saying he had performed enough “illustrious deeds” and urging him to discontinue operations. The Emperor had repeatedly attempted to recall Germanicus and on several occasions had even offered him a highly lucrative position as Consul.

 

Tiberius also urged him give his younger brother Drusus a chance to earn the title of Imperator. Germanicus, however, was not one to relent when final victory seemed within his grasp. He simply could not bring himself to break off now. The Germans would consider it an admission of weakness. In fact, it would endanger the entire policies of the Empire. No doubt he emphasized that Arminius had been seriously weakened, had lost almost all his allies, and that one more mighty blow would bring him to his knees.

 

Would Germanicus have been so persistent if he had known that he would never see the Elbe?