The Last Battle

 

Finally the Cheruskan halted an the border wall of the Angrivarii to the north, the position that seemed most favorable to him for battle.

 

On pages 19-22 of his Annals, Tacitus writes that this was supposed to be the decisive life-or-death battle into which Arminius threw his last reserves.*

 

Footnote: TACITUS, Annalen II, 19-22

 

This wall is believed to have run along the Weser at Leese in a narrow pass between a branch of the river (that no longer exists) and an impassable swamp extending eastward to Steinhuder Lake. According to initial investigations made in 1926, it was a wood and earth fortification wall about 1800 meters long and 8 meters wide atop a slight elevation. However, more recent research suggests that these might be the remains of a medieval militia fortification. Other experts argue that such fortifications never had palisade walls.

 

Still, it is conceivable that centures before this time, such a wall existed at this location, which Tacitus describes quite well. Even though no exact date has been definitively made, there is no logical alternative to the assumption that the remains of the Angrivarii Wall are to be found in this conspicuously narrow terrain.

 

A similar situation exists in the case of Düsselburg in the same area. This is a ring wall 110 x 104 meters, only 5 kilometers east of the probable location of the Angrivarii Wall. In Arminius’ day it was part of the marshy terrain of the Steinhuder Lake, surrounded by the creek that fed the lake. These remains probably date to the Saxon Period (4th and 5th Centuries) and were either part of the defenses destroyed by Charlemagne or else medieval fortifications. Because of its location, this has probably always been a site of staging areas and defensive positions. In Arminius’ nearby battle it played a role similar to that of the “Nammer Camp” at Idistaviso.

 

We might also mention that in the Seven Years War, Graf Wilhelm von Schaumburg-Lippe considered erecting a system of obstructions from the Weser near Leese (!) over the eastern marsh and the Bruch area of Steinhuder Lake including Wilhelmstein, and from there south to the old Heerweg (road) of Bückeburg-Hannover. As early as 1673, Hannoveranian troops built trench fortifications between Leese and Wasserstraße to halt the advance of the French Marshall Turenne toward the east. Arminius too was intent on halting an aggressor from the west, and this is the same area in which his defensive actions took place.

 

Initially, the Angrivarii Wall must have been a very simple border defense. The fact that General Stertinius did not consider it a serious obstacle during his punitive expedition suggests there was hardly anything there. If it had already been the strong fortification constructed by Arminius that could not be circumvented and, like a city wall, could be broken and taken only with heavy losses by the Praetorian Guards after bombardment by heavy siege weapons, the general would certainly not have failed to mention it. If he had not razed it, he would at least have occupied it,

 

At any rate, Arminius improved and expanded the existing border wall into a fortification that was truly impressive, both in its extent and its construction. He did this in a very short time, after the Romans had established their bridgehead across the Weser. He could not have had more than six or eight days in which to build fortifications before Germanicus arrived. This time was gained by the relentless harassing attacks of the Landwehr (militia or home guard). Tacitus relates that these attacks “spread confusion” through the Roman ranks, thus delaying their advance.

 

Arminius accomplished this engineering feat with several thousand men of his army, including auxiliary units he had trained. He was assisted by the entire population, including the Angrivarii, who had been so severely punished by General Stertinius. Construction of this wall was truly a masterpiece of organization by the Cheruskan leader. Arminius’ accomplishment is even more impressive when we consider that he was suffering from fresh wounds while directing construction. The fortification was probably a double palisade wall similar to those built at Tönsberg and Piepenkopf in Lippe, which were typical of Germanic fortifications in the time of the Roman campaigns.

 

In view of Arminius’ leadership skill, we can safely assume that he had planned and anticipated Germanicus’ change of direction to the north from the very beginning. His purpose, of course, was to distract and divert the Roman leader from his real goal of marching to the Elbe.

 

By means of this masterful chess move,** Arminius forced Germanicus into a highly disadvantageous position. The towering obstruction between river and marsh in difficult terrain was strategically excellent – it could be turned into a fatal trap for the enemy. Just as in Year 9, it was again Arminius who dictated the conditions of war to the enemy. The Roman march, which was 30 kilometers as the crow flies, had been delayed and disorganized by the difficult terrain. At the same time the heavily wooded region of the Schaumburger and Loccumer forests offered the Cheruskans excellent opportunities for their preferred way of fighting, which was to constantly surprise and harass the enemy.

 

Footnote: Arminius anticipated the tactic that Frederick the Great descibes in his famous Führungs-Vorschrift (Leadership Guide) of 1747: “The best battles are always those where we compel the enemy to do what he does not want to do ... we never do what the enemy wants.”

 

When Germanicus encountered the wall on the plain, the Germans were positioned with the Weser on their right and the main body of their army distributd along the bulwark. On their left flank, their cavalry was hidden in the wooded area extending to the east. The German cavalry planned to engage the Romans on their right flank and in the rear while the Romans were attacking the wall, thus forcing them toward the Weser. Unfortunately their plan was discovered by Roman intelligence and hindered by a counterattack of the Roman cavalry.

 

Initially, because of the narrow space, Germanicus could use only four legions in the attack, two legions against the wall and two against the wooded area. He was still leaving most decisions to his generals. The Roman columns storming the wall had a very difficult task because of the heights of the wall and terrain.

 

When after very heavy losses the Romans were unable to break through the wall, Germanicus was compelled to withdraw. He then ordered the massive use of archers, Skorpioni (crossbow artillery) and heavy catapults. Despite their valor, the Germans had nothing with which to counter these siege weapons. They were very aware of how much was at stake for everyone! Fighting desperately and with heavy losses, they continued to resist until they were exhausted and the broken, hotly contested wall was finally stormed by the Praetorian Guards.

 

While the defeated defenders of the wall were withdrawing to protective terrain in the north, Germanicus moved at the head of his reserves and cavalry against Arminius’ fighters who were still offering resistance at the edge of the wooded area to the east. Removing his helmet so that he would be more easily recognized by his men, he ordered them to take no prisoners, since victory could be achieved only completely annihilating the Cheruskan tribe.

 

Since the Germans had the forest and marshes at their back and the Romans had the Weser behind them, they were compelled to remain in close proximity to one another. It was a murderous face-to-face struggle.

 

Arminius and Ingomer continued fighting at the head of their mounted troops; but wounded and exhausted, they were not as effective as usual. The slaughter continued until twilight, when the exhausted opponents separated and Germanicus withdrew to build a camp.

 

Tacitus admitted that it had been an unequal contest, with the Germans at a disadvantage because of their primitive armament. The battle between mounted troops remained “indecisive,” meaning that Arminius’ cavalry continued offering effective resistance.

 

 

Germanicus knew that thanks to numerical and technological superiority he had won the battle, but not the war. He could not win until Arminius was dead or in chains and his people totally annihilated.

 

The decimated German army moved further into the northern forests, where Roman pursuit was ineffectual. There was no more fighting, since the Romans were afraid of being attacked in their flanks from the woods and from the marshes in the east. If that happened, they could be driven into the Weser or cut off from their supply line. They too were exhausted, and still facing a long and dangerous return march.

 

Still, Germanicus played the part of the proud victor. Again he caused a “trophy hill” of captured weapons to be built, on which he placed the inscription “All Tribes between Rhine and Elbe Vanquished” even though this was not true. As he well knew, he had reached the Weser, not the Elbe. He had not yet seen the Elbe; in fact, he never would. It was true that he had once again gained the battlefield. However, he had not vanquished his nemesis Arminius, or his army, or his tribe.

 

What could have driven the imperator to make such intemperate and inaccurate claims? Was it mere vanity and the compulsion to assert himself before Tiberius as a successful field commander, or was he blinded by his lust for glory and a triumphal procession in Rome?

 

Since the season was advanced and provisions were running low, Germanicus now ordered the fleet to his location near Schlüsselburg on the Weser so that he could use the waterways to transport his troops and wounded back to their garrisons on the Rhine. In the meantime, he remained in the safety of his camp near Walles. When the ships arrived, it became clear that there was not enough space for everyone, even though he had lost a great many men and horses and had consumed almost all his provisions. Part of the army was compelled to march back along the land route.

 

The real reason for the lack of space was probably that the Germans had destroyed a large number of ships in recent raids, since they were only lightly guarded.

 

The Roman reports are silent about the reason for this sudden lack of space. However, it is significant that immediately after the legions had embarked, the cavalry general, Stertinius, was ordered to attack the Angrivarii in a renewed attempt to subdue them. This time they were clever and compliant enough to save their villages and population by acting subservient. They were well aware that the enemy had been weakened and was retreating and they would soon see the last of them.

 

We have no reports about the homeward march along the land route.

 

The Romans were not alone in wanting to avoid more fighting. With his decimated army, Arminius took no significant action against them, choosing to merely keep them under observation. Subsequently he had good reason to be satisfied with this decision. As soon as Germanicus’ ships had passed the mouth of the river and entered the open sea, they ran into a terrible storm that completely scattered the fleet. A large part of the fleet sank outright with all on board, while other ships were smashed and stranded on widely separated islands as far away as the western coast of Schleswig. There the shipwrecked Romans were either killed or captured and sold as slaves by the local tribesmen. The disaster was the result of the Roman shipbuilders’ broad and shallow-draft river boat concept, which left the vessels completely at the mercy of the stormy North Sea.

 

The only ship that reached the Frisian coast was Germanicus’ flagship, the seagoing triere.

 

For several days and nights a distraught Germanicus wandered beaches covered with wreckage and drowned and bloated legionnaires and animals, loudly bemoaning his misfortune and blaming himself for the calamity. The sight of so much devastation affected him more strongly than a lost battle. He felt so abandoned by fortune and the gods that he fell into a deep depression and could hardly be deterred from suicide.

 

For several days, surviving remnants of the badly battered fleet continued to arrive on shore. The ships presented a doleful sight. Most of their oars had been lost, the rudders patched and repaired in a very clumsy manner. Most of the boats had makeship sails patched together from rags and bits of clothing. Many completely unsteerable ships were towed by others that were more seaworthy.

 

While the surviving Romans were frantically repairing the damaged boats, rescue crews searched the beaches that were littered with corpses, wreckage and the remains of cargo. There were very few survivors. Later they learned that some of the wrecked ships had been blown as far as Britain.

 

It must have taken many days to collect the remains of the fleet. After prolonged delays and a very dangerous and difficult voyage, Germanicus finally made his way back to the Rhine garrisons. He resembled a defeated rather than victorious commander.

 

Again he compensated his soldiers for all their reported losses. We do not know how many survived the campaign that was conducted with such enormous expenditures of men, ships and war matieriél, including the major battles of Idistaviso, the Agrivarii Wall and the last catastrophic storm.

 

However, the losses were so great that even Tacitus wrote of a “great misfortune.” Coming from him, such a candid admission is very significant.

 

We also suspect that the losses caused by the heavily emphasized “catastrophe at sea” were greatly overstated in order to conceal the heavy losses of the last battles. After all, Germanicus had to justify the indisputable fact that he returned from the campaign with a greatly decimated army and lost most of the fleet. He preferred to blame “higher powers” for his heavy losses.

 

This storm, the second catastrophe caused by the elements, meant the end of the vainglorious imperator’s dream of being an immortal field commander.

 

He made one more attempt to find compensation for the catastrophe he had suffered. Before the end of the year, Germanicus sent General Silius with 30,000 men and 3,000 horsemen against the Chatten tribe to murder, plunder and take prisoners, even though there was no reason for war. He himself attacked the territory of the Marsers and desolated their lands without meeting resistance. Attempting to assuage his battered pride with carnage and the blood of innocents, he was now acting irrationally and with boundless fury.

 

He did succeed in forcing Mallowendus, the duke of the Marsers, to surrender and relinquish the eagle of the 18th Legion that Arminius had captured in Year 9. This was the most nearly glorious conclusion to three years of meager successes that Germanicus could still hope for. After he had recaptured the eagle, he complied with the demands of his outraged Uncle Tiberius and returned to Rome.