The Turnaround

 

Obstinate and pig-headed, Germanicus was determined to continue his war. He attempted to persuade skeptical Tiberius by depicting his recently concluded campaign as a great success that needed only one last effort to achieve total victory.

 

The Emperor disregarded Germanicus’ arguments, however. For him, the army was much too valuable to allow his hotheaded nephew to squander it in the dangerous North. For Tiberius, every legionnaire lost was one too many. Gritting his teeth, Germanicus had no choice except to defer to the Emperor’s decision. Did he think that Tiberius was just jealous of his fame and glory? From his point of view, he nearly always “won.” Or did he admit to himself that his “victories” had in fact been disasters? Perhaps Tiberius, who was a much better strategist than Germanicus, had rubbed his nose in this bitter truth. Such was Tiberius’ way.

 

By all objective standards, it was clear that Germanicus had won no clear- cut victories, either at Idistaviso or the Agrivarii Wall. Idistaviso had been an unsuccessful attempt at breakthrough, while he had gained nothing at the Agrivarii Wall except a clear path for retreat to the Rhine. It was absurd to treat it as a “brilliant victory over all the Barbarians between the Rhine and Elbe.”

 

Another important reason for the emperor’s conclusion about Germanicus’ campaigns was that the tribes had developed a capability for conducting extensive and coordinated military actions. For the first time, Arminius’ confederates - the Marsers, Chatten and Agrivarii tribes - had attacked the most easterly Roman strongpoints, while Germanicus was preoccupied in the North. Arminius’ strategy was inconceivable without a well organized and well functioning intelligence system that enabled effective coordination of the German forces.

 

As a result of these recent attacks, realistic Tiberius sensed an imminent threat to the Rhine frontier. If he considered the German tribes capable of carrying out a limited joint offensive, he would also consider the possibility of their conducting future mass actions in the West, possibly coordinated with Marbod in the Southeast, that could involve the Romans in a two front war.

 

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Sketch with Caption:

The so-called “Sword of Tiberius”. This metal scabbard-mouth depicts Germanicus presenting Tiberius with a statuette of Victoria as a symbod of his “victory” over the Germanic tribes.

 

He was also aware that Rome’s constant attacks on their freedom and independence had greatly intensified a sense of solidarity among the German tribes and forced them together in a common defense. To Tiberius this spelled real danger for Roman security, and it alarmed the instincts of the clever politician and tactician who had always achieved more through negotiations than war. Ever the crafty military man, he understood very clearly that this perpetual “Barbarian War” would ultimately overtax the Empire. In the long run, the war could not be won.

 

The meager successes of Rome’s wars of expansion had now lasted thirty years and had entailed enormous sacrifices of men and material. They were simply too expensive – there was no correlation between investment and success.

 

Following 16 AD there was no more talk of moving the eastern frontier to the Elbe. In the following years, Rome’s foreign policy was limited to strengthening defenses of its existing positions and entering into treaties with Germanic tribes in both East and West, and the dream of a Roman province including all Germania gave way to sober political wisdom and a sense of proportion.

 

The dream was abandoned and the old Rhein border became permanent.

 

The “Turnaround on the Weser” -- the sudden cessation of hostilities -- must have seemed like a miracle to Arminius. It was like the end of the Seven Years War in 1762 to Frederick the Great, the “miracle on the Marne” to the French in 1914 and the “Miracle of Dunkirk” 1940 to the British.

 

After all was said and done he was the winner even if not a “glorious victor” as Germanicus pretended to be. For Arminius, the important thing was that the Roman armies had withdrawn without accomplishing their main goal. That was real victory! His victory!

 

The stubborn resistance carried out with total personal commitment and sacrifice had succeeded. Alone and relying on his own resources, with weak forces and weaker weapons, allied only with the forces of nature in his homeland, he had finally achieved his goal of regaining lost freedom and assuring Germanic independence. His effort was finally crowned with success.

 

What must have gone through the mind of his enemy? If he was honest with himself, Germanicus would have admitted with great exasperation that he had achieved very incomplete success.

 

Arminius had conducted himself magnificently during the battle of the Agrivarii Wall. With his last strength and his unshakable perseverance, he had proven himself an outstanding campaigner and military leader. Although his difficulties had greatly increased since the year 14, he had perfected his leadership skills to become the greatest commander of his age.

 

In the year 17, in order to conceal failures from the Roman people, Tiberius granted his adopted son a dazzling triumphal procession, in which he celebrated himself as the great “German Tamer.”

 

Riding in a chariot decorated with laurel leaves, Germanicus wore a purple toga ornamented with golden stars and diadem – a dazzling image of the god war whom the Roman masses applauded frenetically. His five beautiful children, similarly costumed, rode with him. Rome had not seen such a festival in many years. The Germans finally, finally conquered!

 

In in sensation-craving eyes of the Roman street mobs, the abject display of Arminius’ captured wife and little boy no doubt contributed to the spectacle. The procession included prisoners of war in chains, among which were German noblemen with their wives and priests as well as captured weapons and field standards.

 

There were also theatrical depictions of allegorical groupings, battles and German mountains and rivers, wagons and shoulder borne scaffolds.

 

After such an excess of glory came bitter disappointment, however, as the emperor relieved Germanicus of his Rhine command. Ultimately, Tiberius assigned him to consular posts in Egypt and the distant Orient, where he was politically and militarily neutralized. He never overcame this mortifying blow.

 

During his period in office, he repeatedly incurred the Emperor’s extreme displeasure and brought censure upon himself beause of his arbitrary political acts.

 

When Germanicus returned to his consular post in Antioch after a long journey, he found that all the directives he had made in the towns and military garrisons had been reversed or else were no longer in effect. The person behind this “insurrection” was Piso, the scheming governor of Syria, who was constantly causing difficulties for him and even insulted him to his face.

 

The procession was intended to distract public attention from the failure of Germanicus’ attempts to convert Germania between Rhein and Elbe into a Roman province. Germania remained free.

 

Violent confrontations broke out between Germanicus and Piso. Soon after this, Germanicus suddenly became ill and died of poison on the 10th day of October in the year 19 AD. Just 33 years old, he had been completely demoralized by Piso’s vicious intrigues and unrelenting psychological terror against him and his family. After his early death, Germanicus’ supporters said that he was as great a commander as Alexander the Great, who also died at age 33.

 

They also said that the only reason he had been unsuccessful in overcoming Arminius and the German tribes was because he had been unlucky in war. Many Romans believed that the Emperor had been envious of his popularity and affable manner and had punished him for pursuing social and political goals of which he disapproved, such as granting democratic freedoms to the Roman population. Could it be that Tiberius was really afraid of being displaced by his nephew?

 

There was no dearth of posthumous honors paid to the idolized young “hero” who had left the stage much too soon. His eternal fame was assured by three triumphal arches, a splendid tomb, catafalque, countless statues, golden bust and a place of honor in the Roman theatre. All this soon faded into forgetfulness, however. His enemy Piso was accused as the suspected murderer. Although it could not be proven that he was directly responsible, he committed suicide in order to escape public odium.

 

Despite the great honors bestowed by his contemporaries and later historians, Germanicus remains a tragic figure. His fate is hardly different from that of his arch enemy Arminius, who was murdered at the same age. No triumphal ceremonies were planned in Arminius’ honor, even though he certainly deserved them. Nevertheless, his people have lovingly retained his memory in their hearts and songs for many generations. His memory has had a greater and longer lasting significance than the pompous and overdrawn reputation of Germanicus.