Tiberius, Emperor
of the Roman Empire

 

Tiberius Claudius Nero was descended from the ancient aristocratic Roman family Claudia. He was was adopted stepson of Augustus, an older brother of Drusus, who died in 9 AD. He was born in 42 BC and died in 37 AD, serving as Roman emperor from 14 until 37 AD. In his will, Augustus had designated his stepson Tiberius as principal heir. Seven twelfths of all his wealth went to Tiberius, which made him the richest man in the world.

 

He is described as tall and sturdy with military bearing, severe mien and unapproachable, distrusting nature. He had a pronounced ability for identifying individuals’ weaknesses, which enabled him to play them off against each other. His life was replete with intrigues and scandals.

 

As long as Augustus was alive he acted as his fellow regent, sharing his tribunal powers. The Prinzipat (office of Emperor) created by Augustus was a kind of constitutional monarchy in which the emperor and senate shared the powers of government. The emperor himself exerted powerful influence on the legislative branch. He commanded all the Roman military forces and thus had the power to decide whether there would be war or peace. Nine Praetorian cohorts of 500 men each were assigned as his bodyguard. Apparently he needed at least 4,500 men for his personal protection.

 

After all, he was Pontifex Maximus, head priest, the intermediary between the people and the gods. His official title was Imperator, a title that was originally given to the commander only by his soldiers.

 

Nero Claudius Drusus, the younger stepbrother of Tiberius, was a brilliant young war hero who had become famous by his extensive compaigns in the interior of Germania. In 9 AD he had penetrated as far as the Elbe. Then, however, he was so badly injured in an accidental fall from his horse that he never recovered. Tiberius immediately left Rome and crossed the Alps. Riding day and night for 300 kilimeters and accompanied only by a German guide, he rode through the dangerous lands of the Germanic tribes in order to pay his respects to his dying brother. Drusus died at age 30.

 

Tiberius then took over command of the army and conducted the campaign to a successful end. In Rome he was honored with a triumphal procession and a consulship.

 

According to Velleius Paterculus, his staff officer and compiler of war reports written that at that time, Germania was practically a Roman province. The entire area between the Rhine and Elbe on one side and the Baltic and Erz Mountains on the other was already considered a Roman province. It was in the preliminary stages of a military occupation zone, although the area had not yet been at all Romanized.

 

In dealing with foreign peoples that he intended to subdue, Tiberius always tried first to achieve his goal with diplomacy and flattery rather that beginning with military force. In this respect he was fundamentally different from his nephew Germanicus.

 

In 8 AD Tiberius carried out “ethnic cleansing” of 40,000 members of the Sugambri tribe because he considered them especially dangerous.

 

First the nobility were gathered together under some pretext or other, then overpowered, thrown in chains and deported to the left bank of the Rhine. Since it was assumed that they could not be integrated into the Roman Empire, they were then clubbed to death. In this instance Tiberius resorted to the cruel methods of Julius Caesar, in contrast to his usual practice.

 

Sometime after 4 AD he subjugated four of the northwestern tribes, including the Cheruskans under Duke Sigimer. In the following year he moved against the various Germanic tribes that lived along the Baltic and subdued them.

 

One of his military masterpieces was a combined army and naval operation that converged on a common destination from different directions, apparently the first operation of its kind. His nephew Germanicus later attempted to use the same strategy against Arminius, but was unsuccessful. Tiberius had apparently become acquainted with the Baltic Sea in the Year 5.

 

During his numerous campaigns in Germania, he had accumulated a great deal of experience and had acquired expert knowledge of the land, its inhabitants and their characteristics. Varus could have learned a great deal from him.

 

Early in his career, Tiberius identified the Germans’ great flaw: their disunity. He had become intimate with the tribal leaders, who tended to engage in bitter disputes and bear grudges. Sooner than anyone else, he anticipated the danger threatening the Empire in the North; and for this reason he was seriously concerned about its continued existence.

 

In 6 AD he set out from the Rhine and Danube with 12 legions plus large numbers of auxiliaries (a total of 150,000 men) in a pincers attack on Marbod, the king of the Marcomanni tribe, whose standing army of 74,000 was considered a serious threat to the porous and extensive Danubian border. However, he was forced to call off the operation during the approach march. A major uprising had broken out in Pannonia and Ilyria (today’s Hungary, Dalmatia and Balkan region), where he remained preoccupied for almost four years. The Panonia uprising saved Marbod from certain defeat and prepared the way for Arminius’ liberation struggle.

 

During the Balkan war young Germanicus learned a great deal about his uncle’s stragegy while serving as an officer on his staff, but he learned very little about his diplomacy. We know next to nothing about the initial human relationship between the two. It appears that Tiberius did not have a very high opinion of his young nephew’s ability to command armies. After three very expensive campaigns in Germania produced no convincing results, he literally sent him into the desert.

 

After the conclusion of the Balkan campaign, which lasted from 6 to 9 AD, Tiberius quickly secured the Rhine border against a possible onslaught by the Germans. He did this by doubling the number of legions to eight, as a reaction to the defeat of Varus. Four of these legions formed the army in Lower Germania and four the army in Upper Germania. To further strengthen this regrouping he reinforced and expanded the existing fortresses and built new ones as well.

 

He also attempted several minor incursions along the right bank of the Rhine, but these were inconsequential. Arminius would not allow himself to be provoked into fighting on Tiberus’ terms.

 

After his victories, however, the Germans resumed quarrelling among themselves. After Arminiius’ death, the Marcomanni as well as the tribes along the North Sea and the Elbe did not combine to attack the Roman legions in western, northern and southeastern Germania. The combined major assault that Tiberius expected and feared along the Rhine border did not take place.

 

Tiberius took advantage of the peaceful interlude to cut wide roadways through the huge forested regions, which were to be used as future march routes toward the East, This suggests that he might have been considering a resumption of Augustus’ policy of expansion.

 

Tiberius was an outstanding leader of troops who combined military skill and toughness with the smoothness and flattery of the accomplished diplomat. He always deferred to sober rationality rather than the quest for superficial glory. He avoided confederated enemies, attacking individual or isolated enemies instead. In his war counsels he informed himself thoroughly on every aspect, but he seldom decided in favor of a plan just because others approved – he always relied on his own judgment.

 

He had the reputation of being severe and even cruel, but his solicitousness for his soldiers was exemplary. He was hard on himself as well: he never rode in a wagon or palanquin, but always sat in the saddle. He expected and demanded self-discipline, especially from his subordinates. He often scolded loudly, but he seldom punished his soldiers. He fretted over minor detail and lived as simply as his legionnaires. Since he was known to be very fond of wine, his soldiers gave him the nickname of “Biberius” (Big Drinker.)

 

He gave only written orders and he instructed his officers to immediately report any instructions that were unclear so that they could immediately be clarified. Troop training and discipline were extremely important to him, and he insisted on constant instruction and enforcement among the troops. Under his nephew Germanicus, the opposite tended to be the rule.

 

Tiberius’ praiseworthy military qualities contrasted sharply with his other character traits, which were generally described as indifference or perverseness.

 

His greatest concern was for public security. When street robberies and criminality became prevalent in Italy, he greatly increased the number of military and police garrisons. He reacted very drastically to popular uprisings, which he repressed ruthlessly.

 

When the aging Augustus began to sicken, Tiberius returned to Rome in order to be present after his demise. In13 AD, even before the old emperor died, he had given young prince Germanicus supreme command of the eight legions on the Rhine, in order to assure the imperial succession.

 

This aroused the distrust of Tiberius who had become Augustus’ successor in 14 AD. The distrusting skepticism that he harbored toward his nephew (and nephew’s wife Agrippina) arose from the fear that Germanicus, since he commanded so many legions, was idolized by the people and worshipped by the army and could one day seize power from him.

 

Germanicus apparently never had any such intention. On the contrary: Following major mutinies in the Rhein fortresses in 14 AD, his soldiers implored him to declare himself emperor instead of his unpopular uncle. Germanicus manfully withstood the temptation.

 

Tiberius never overcame his feelings of envy and jealousy toward the idolized young commander, although he did not allow his feelings to be noticed.

 

It appears that tensions appeared more frequently in later years, which probably strengthened his opinion that Germanicus’ much touted “victories” were too dearly bought. Since he had always achieved more through negotiations and diplomacy, he was highly critical of Germanicus’ ruthless campaigns for vengeance. On several occasions at the zenith of Germanicus’ military career, he attempted to relieve him of command before he could commit even greater blunders.

 

Perhaps the emperor shared the view of the Prussian king Frederick II, who had no use for “unlucky officers” and ruthlessly relieved them of command regardless of their rank.

 

In 16 AD, after recalling the unlucky commander, crafty old Tiberius explained his changed policy toward the Germans in these words: “It is better to leave the Germans alone to fight among themselves.

 

Dissention is their greatest enemy. We will see that when they are no longer afraid of occupation by a foreign power, they will turn their weapons against each other and slay their brothers as though they were they were gladiators in the ring.”

 

Goethe made a very similar observation in 1815, after the fall of Napoleon: “It is the German custom to attack each other as soon as we have freed ourselves of foreign domination.” Alas, the wars between Germanic tribes did not end with their victory over Rome - they continued for many centuries.

 

History very quickly proved Tiberius right. Within a year, the armies of Arminius and Marbod were engaged in raging battles somewhere in the northern part of Bohemia. The Romans had no need to continue their expensive wars in Germania! The German tribes conducted perpetual ferocious wars among themselves and against each other. With a clear conscience, Rome was able to withdraw its forces and observe the ferocioous self-inflicted German bloodletting from the safety of the Rhine and Danube, without having to intervene or dirty its hands.

 

All in all, Tiberius ruled the Empire ably and responsibly during his reign (14 – 37 AD). His remarkable decision to discontinue Rome’s wars of conquest reflected the wise insights and sober realization that characterized him. He understood that wars are conducted militarily but won politically and he realized that, in the long run, the security of a Roman Province of Germania would have had to be maintained by the commitment of huge masses of troops along the Elbe and Danube. Opposing them would have been the unexplored vastness of the East as well as the forces of of numerous Germanic tribes.

 

In addition to the forces permanently stationed at the borders, there would have to be another giant army of occupation for the hinterland, such as was already stationed in Gaul. All this was no longer an option: it was simply impossible. It had become necessary to relinquish of additional annexations precisely because of Gaul.

 

Constant resentments were simmering there because of excessive taxes and requisitions and because of capricious actions on the part of the Roman government. The indigenous peoples there had had to bear the greatest financial and material burdens of Germanicus’ wars. It had turned out that the land that had been Romanized since the days of Julius Caesar still could not be left to its own devices, but still required continuing military control.

 

An additional reason why Rome had to discontinue its campaigns against the northern Germanic tribes was the huge burdens that grew out of the dangerous conflict with the Parthians (Iranians) in the Far East, who remained unconquered.

 

The ancient striving for unchallenged supremacy from the the Rhine to the Danube to the Caucasus from the Atlantic to the Euphrates and Red Sea, from the upper Nile to the Sahara was gradually abandoned. The huge Empire with its endless borders was badly overextended. In future it limited itself to holding onto as much as possible of what it had already conquered. Tiberius’ slogan was: “No to experiments, no to risks, yes to security.”

 

As long as Rome, following countless wars that lasted for four centuries, attempted to maintain its claim to sole supremacy in the world, it was not possible for it to discontinue the powerful exertions of many generations of Romans, including annexation of the region extending to the Elbe. Germania’s heartland escaped occupation and subjugation. The people were able to retain their homeland and freedom as well as their own highly characteristic peasant culture and way of life.

 

This was Herman’s great accomplishment. It was Arminius who created the prerequisite for their survival as an independent ethnic group. The inconstant shirker Marbod deserves no credit for this.

 

It would be interesting to know Tiberius’ real opinion of Arminius.

 

Unfortunately his stated opinion on the subject was never recorded. If he was honest, the upright old trooper must have conceded great admiration for this brilliant “barbarian” with the Roman upbringing. He obviously feared him as well, since he expected an offensive against the Left Bank of the Rhine combined with a military alliance with King Marbod. His military precautions show this quite clearly.

 

Arminius’ feelings toward Tiberius must have been just as ambiguous. On the one hand he admired the experienced and successful strategist, while on the other hand he must have seen him as a lonely, degenerate, cruel man who was devoid of all human emotions.

 

Tiberius’ relaltionship to the king of the Marcomanni, Marbod, his other great enemy (who begged for his protection after his defeat by Arminius) was made clear in his refusal to lend him support. Tiberius valued his treachery but he had not use for the traitor, whom he allowed to fall as soon as he was no longer useful.

 

Tiberius’ attitude toward established coalition partners was revealed in his dealings with the Frisians, who rebelled after having long been allied with Rome. The Frisians rebelled because the Romans imposed an impossible norm on their required submission of hides -- the norm of an aurochs, which was much larger than the domesticated Germanic cattle.

 

The Frisians soundly defeated a contingent of Roman troops that was sent to quell the uprising, and the Romans lost the recently conquered territory. Surprisingly, Tiberius did not retaliate against them. He forbade publication of the number of Roman casualties and he ordered that hostilities be discontinued. It would be typical of him if he reprimanded the initiator of the foolish order on account of the heavy losses. This was a long serving-staff officer who commanded the Frisian contingent. Such a stupid and unneccessary incident would never have happened under his leadership, since he had been familiar with the Frisians since the time of Drusus.

 

It was said that Tiberius always hid his feelings and emotions.

 

He was a master of deception and hypocrisy, completely inscrutable. He was described as being unaccomodating, gruff, distrustful, devious, severe and cold as ice. Most people were afraid of him because he had the reputation of being very cruel. He was a man who “walked on corpses” -- very skillful at hiding his own mistakes and miscalculations. He never acted recklessly, but always after careful consideration. He was a person of great intelligence, given to cool reckoning. In this respect he was similar to Arminius.

 

He rejected the idea of being worshipped as a god (as was Augustus) with the explanation that this would be presumptuous for a mortal man. He also rejected the cult of personality as well as exaggerated distinctions. He avoided all luxuries, yet he could be quite generous if it served to improve his reputation.

 

With advancing age, he withdrew to the remoteness of the Campania. Here he indulged in every imaginable vice and all the cruelties for which he had been infamous since his youth. He preferred the Campania because he “did not want to officially commit murder in Rome.” Tortures and sadistic torments were his everyday diversions. Many persons who knew him well considered him to be evil incarnate.

 

Tiberius was ashamed of his advanced age. Once a stately figure, he was now stooped like a very old man. We are told that he was completely bald, his face constantly discolored by a rash and covered with bandages. In all probability he had syphilis.

 

With a very small retinue, he then withdrew to the isolation of the island of Rhodes. He was accompanied only by a single senator, a judge, the commander of his bodyguard and one nobleman of high degree in addition to several highly educated Greek scientists. For eleven years he stayed away from Rome, where a great many of his countrymen wished for his death.

 

Then he again transferred to his favorite residence Capri as he was embittered over the opposition of the senate. He was fond of the rocky island on account of its mild climate. At Capri there was but a single small landing, which was constantly guarded, and Tiberius felt safe from attacks. In addition to this he had established a secret spy and intelligence system, so that nothing remained hidden from him. On Capri he had a dozen luxurious villas where he could indulge his numerous debaucheries and dalliances. He now tended to government business only superficially and left everything to his minion Aelius Seianus, whose malevolent influence he perceived only too late.

 

Even with all his safety measures, he lived in constant fear of the intrigues of his family. All his dealings with them were characterized by extreme caution and mistrust.

 

After the year 36 his health deteriorated markedly. He succumbed rapidly and felt his end drawing nigh. Nevertheless, he he mocked his physicians and refused to give up his debauched liestyle. He continued trying to disguise his unmistakable physical decay until the day of his death.

 

When a large part of the Avenins district and a famous circus burned down in Rome, he generously donated 100 million Sesterci for its reconstruction, which won him great favor among the masses. He was hoping to assure himself good repute after his death.

 

When he was lying in infirmary and assumed dead, and Caligula, son of Germanicus, had already been acknowledged Tiberius’ successor, he recovered to the terrified amazement of all who had long been wishing for his death. Finally the prefect of his bodyguard had the dying man smothered under a pile of woolen blankets. Such was the death of Emperor Tiberius on 16 March of the year 37 AD at the age of 79.